Browse the complete guide

Front matter

The factory in one line

Part I — Understand

Part II — Design

Part III — Build

Part IV — Prove

Part V — Operate

Part VI — Improve

Appendix — Reference

Appendix — Mission Control case studies

Appendix — Research

Referenceappendix

Canonical Glossary

On this page12 sections
  1. Factory concepts
  2. Tools, context, models, and interoperability
  3. Governed delivery records
  4. Governance concepts
  5. Quality and assurance concepts
  6. Runtime concepts
  7. Platform experience and agentic security
  8. Autonomy and trust
  9. Context and configuration concepts
  10. Factory learning and improvement
  11. Architecture, governance, and operations concepts
  12. Outcome measures

This glossary defines terms by the responsibility they own. A useful definition also states what the concept does not prove or authorize.

Entries marked 🔑 are among the fifty concepts to have cold — the on-ramp for a first-time reader. Everything else here stays for reference; nothing is trimmed to make room for the marker.

Factory concepts

AI Software Factory — A governed engineering operating model that turns business intent into validated customer value through human accountability, agent execution, policy, independent validation, evidence, and feedback. It is larger than a coding tool or agent runtime.

Software Factory — A repeatable delivery system that composes people, process, automation, environments, quality controls, and feedback from intent through production. An AI Software Factory uses agents as bounded participants; the factory remains the larger engineering system.

Three actors — The division of labor a factory is built on: humans define intent, constraints, priorities, risk, and consequential decisions; agents investigate, plan, use tools, modify software, and execute bounded work; deterministic code enforces contracts, scope, identity, tests, verification, evidence, security boundaries, currentness, and acceptance gates. A failure mode is usually one actor doing another's job.

Agent Factory — The governed capability supply chain that creates, packages, versions, evaluates, publishes, discovers, admits, deprecates, and revokes reusable agents, skills, tools, model profiles, and configurations. It supplies capabilities to an AI Software Factory but does not authorize or accept a particular delivery outcome.

Capability Registry 🔑 — The authoritative service that assigns canonical identity, stores immutable versions and provenance, resolves dependencies and compatibility, records evaluation and certification, and enforces lifecycle state for reusable factory capabilities. A searchable catalog may present its contents but is not itself the authority.

Agent Registry — The type-specific registry for Agent Definitions and their ownership, composition, eligibility, evaluation, support, and lifecycle. An agent name without an exact registered version is not a reproducible binding.

Skill Registry — The type-specific registry for reusable, evaluated task methods and their versions, dependencies, required tools, compatibility, ownership, and lifecycle. Publication does not grant permission to use a skill for a particular WorkOrder.

Tool Registry — The type-specific registry for tool schemas, endpoints, side effects, identity requirements, data classifications, policies, qualifications, and lifecycle. Discovery does not imply authorization.

Prompt Registry — The type-specific registry for parameterized prompt and instruction artifacts, including source, immutable versions, variables, expected outputs, dependencies, evaluation, and promotion status. Runtime composition must remain attributable to exact versions.

Evaluator Registry — The type-specific registry for deterministic checks, human rubrics, model graders, datasets, calibration evidence, eligible claims, and lifecycle. A registered evaluator cannot certify its own reliability.

Capability Package — An immutable, digest-bound artifact containing a capability manifest, content or executable source, schemas, dependencies, tests, evaluation references, provenance, signature, and lifecycle metadata.

Compatibility metadata — The declared set of harness versions, model profiles, runtimes, and peer capabilities a capability version has been tested with. It is evidence only when a conformance suite has passed against the exact combination.

Version lineage — The recorded chain from a capability version to its predecessors and successors, with the reason each was cut, so an operator can see what changed between the version that ran and the version that runs now.

Trust level — The standing a capability has earned (for example internal and certified, external and reviewed, external and unreviewed). It sets a ceiling on the risk classes and autonomy levels in which the capability may be resolved; it does not grant permission.

Capability lifecycle verbs — Author, package, test, certify, publish, discover, activate, upgrade, deprecate, revoke. Activation is a consuming workspace or Factory Version binding a certified version into its resolved graph; upgrade is a new resolution with its own compatibility check.

Capability Certification — A scoped, expiring decision that an exact capability graph has sufficient evidence for defined tasks, risks, environments, data classes, and controls. It is not a universal quality claim.

Capability deprecation — A lifecycle state that warns against new use, names a support and migration window, and may restrict eligibility while existing consumers move. It differs from immediate revocation.

Capability revocation — An authoritative state that blocks new resolution of an unsafe or invalid capability version and triggers impact analysis for active consumers while preserving historical lineage.

Agentic software factory — An informal synonym that emphasizes the use of agents across the software lifecycle. This guide uses AI Software Factory as the canonical product and operating-model term; “agentic” describes how some work is executed, not a reduction of the factory to agents alone.

Agentic software engineering — An engineering mode in which model-driven agents pursue bounded outcomes through tools and an observe-adjust loop while a deterministic platform owns authority, state, evidence, recovery, and delivery controls. It does not mean replacing every deterministic workflow with an agent.

Intent-to-Delivery Lifecycle — The factory value stream summarized as Intent → Plan → Define Agent → Execute through Harness → Apply Skills → Evaluate → Improve → Deliver Software. It is a mnemonic, not a literal call graph: skills execute inside the harnessed loop and improvement changes future versions through governed promotion.

Builder Intent 🔑 — The outcome a builder is trying to achieve together with its business reason, constraints, acceptance criteria, risk, source references, and stop conditions. Intent is the product interface; a literal prompt is only one input used to clarify it.

Builder surface — A UI, CLI, API, chat, IDE, or automation entry point through which a developer, PM, QA engineer, designer, or other authorized builder expresses intent, reviews evidence, or makes a decision. Every surface must converge on the same authoritative contracts.

Capability map — A maintained mapping from builder outcomes and UI actions to governed APIs or tools, shared state, required authority, evidence, and test coverage. It exposes missing, shadow, duplicated, or human-only paths.

Authorized action parity — The property that an agent can achieve each appropriate builder outcome through the same authoritative state transitions and controls. It does not give the agent human-only approval or irreversible authority.

Coding assistant — A system that suggests, explains, or generates code under direct human control. It does not own a governed delivery lifecycle.

Agentic AI — Systems in which a model plans, acts through tools, observes the result, and continues toward a goal without a person driving every step. The label says nothing about trust: an agent is only as reliable as the harness, evidence, and authority around it. Not a chatbot, and not a synonym for autonomy.

Agent lifecycle — Build, deploy, monitor, improve, retire — the same lifecycle any production component has, applied to an Agent Definition. In this guide each transition is a governed state with an owner, evidence, and a promotion or deprecation record; nothing moves because time passed.

Multi-agent system — Several specialised agents working toward one goal through explicit handoffs, shared typed state, and bounded authority per agent. Every extra agent is tokens, latency, and failure surface; the guide's rule is one agent until a boundary demands a second (Chapter 23).

Agent — A model-driven worker that can reason, choose tools, act, observe the result, and continue toward a bounded objective. Capability does not imply authority.

Autonomous agent — An agent permitted to perform several steps without human instruction at every step. Its autonomy remains scoped by policy, permissions, budgets, stop conditions, evidence, and escalation.

AI Coding Agent — An agent specialized for repository investigation, planning, code or configuration changes, testing, review, and related software engineering work. Repository capability does not grant publication, merge, release, or acceptance authority.

Autonomous Coding — Bounded software-engineering work that an AI Coding Agent may pursue across several tool-use steps without continuous human input. It describes execution autonomy, not autonomous approval, merge, or release.

Agentic workflow — A durable, versioned workflow in which one or more agents perform bounded reasoning and tool-use steps under explicit contracts. It is larger than an agent loop and retains progress when no model process is running.

Agent Definition — A versioned declaration of an agent's role, objective, instructions, capabilities, eligible models, tools, skills, context policy, permissions, budgets, stop conditions, escalation, success criteria, and evaluation policy. It is configuration, not a credential.

Agent Harness 🔑 — The systems surrounding a model that make agent execution usable and controllable through tools, context, state, lifecycle, budgets, stop conditions, telemetry, and structured results. This guide separates the inner harness from the outer harness so that execution behavior is not confused with control-plane authority.

AI Coding Harness — An Agent Harness specialized for repository work such as code search, file edits, commands, tests, Git operations, and development feedback. Product integrations must still identify which inner- and outer-harness responsibilities they implement.

Inner Harness — The coding or agent loop that prepares model input, manages context, exposes and executes tools, streams observations, compacts or resumes a session, and determines when one session stops. It does not own durable cross-run workflow authority.

Outer Harness — The adapter and supervisor around an inner harness that validates the execution contract, provisions the environment, translates lifecycle events, enforces runtime budgets, captures artifacts, classifies completion, and tears down resources. It cannot accept or publish its own work.

Maximum review iterations — An outer-loop parameter, owned by the harness rather than the model, that caps how many review-and-fix cycles one Attempt may consume before the work is escalated to a human. Bounded iterations, a deterministic exit condition, and a human handoff make a fix loop safe.

Provider lock-in — The condition in which switching harness, model, or compute vendor would cost more than the switch is worth because transcripts, instructions, skills, and evidence exist only in one vendor's shape.

Exit strategy — The documented, rehearsed path out of a provider: what is kept in the factory's own format, which adapter would be qualified next, and how long the switch would take. It is proven by having run the same workload through two adapters, not by asserting portability.

Composable stack — A factory whose model, harness, environment, compute, and orchestration are separately chosen components behind interfaces the organization owns. It is slower to adopt and easier to leave than a vertically integrated stack.

Vertically integrated stack — A factory in which one vendor supplies model, harness, environment, and orchestration as a single product. It is fastest to adopt and hardest to exit.

Managed execution versus self-hosted harness — Whether the vendor runs the harness on its own fleet under its own operations, or the organization runs the harness on its own workers with its own identity and network boundaries.

Commodity layer — The band of the stack that many organizations need in the same shape and that the market or open-source community is converging on: agent-loop mechanics, sandbox provisioning, workflow engines, tracing transport, vector stores, model APIs, CI runners. The default is to adopt it behind a standard contract; owning it buys nothing a competitor cannot buy.

Differentiated layer — The band of the stack only this organization can decide and that compounds when done well: the control plane's authority and evidence model, policy layers, repository profiles and enterprise context, evaluation sets from real work, learning signals, and the Builder Experience. The default is to build it and treat its contracts as the product.

Platform boundary — The set of contracts at which an organization's own components meet adopted ones. It is a strategic choice and it moves as capabilities become commodity; standard contracts and conformance suites are what keep it movable.

Conformance suite — The behavioural tests a replacement harness, sandbox provider, model gateway, or other adopted component must pass to be admitted behind a standard contract. Swappability is proven by conformance, never by a matching product name.

Exit cost — The real price of leaving an adopted component, measured by attempting the export before signing: records in a documented schema, evidence readable without the vendor, a replaceable harness, an API rather than only a UI. High exit cost is adopted with the exit rehearsed, not ignored.

Vendor independence — The property that the organization's architecture survives a vendor's disappearance, acquisition, or repricing. It is what standard contracts, conformance, and rehearsed exits exist to protect.

Community health — For an open-source foundation, the observable signals that the project will exist when the plan ends: maintainer count and diversity, release cadence, issue response time, and governance model. For a commercial foundation, the analogous signals are runway, roadmap transparency, and customer base.

Agent Runtime 🔑 — The execution substrate that starts, observes, controls, and terminates agent sessions or Attempts using an exact harness, environment, identity, and model route. Runtime capability does not establish business authority.

Skill 🔑 — A reusable, versioned, evaluated method that supplies instructions, decision criteria, examples, and tool-use patterns for a class of tasks. A skill teaches behavior; it does not grant authority or certify its own result.

Rule (eager push) — Mandatory steering that the harness pushes into the agent's context on every run regardless of task: conventions, prohibited actions, house style. A rule is always present and costs context on every turn; a skill, by contrast, is loaded lazily when the agent judges it relevant. Both are versioned context as code.

Skill package (plugin) — A versioned, agent-agnostic bundle of skills, rules, commands, and hooks, installed by exact version from a registry, a Git source, or a local path, the way a language package is installed. It is the distribution form of a Capability Package for the skill type.

Skill manifest and lockfile — The project file that declares which skill packages a project depends on and at what version range (the manifest), and the file recording the exact versions installed (the lockfile). The lockfile is the resolution lock for skills, written to disk; updates move only within the compatible range unless a major bump is explicit.

Skill inventory — A scan of every repository in a source-control organization for skill files and agent configuration, classifying each skill as first-party or third-party, flagging duplicate copies and drift between them, and ranking findings by security severity. It is the consuming-side view that the registry's active-use inventory must agree with.

Reviewer plugin — A configuration of weighted judges, each with a rubric, used to score a skill's fitness for an agent: description specificity, completeness, trigger quality, and distinctiveness; content conciseness, actionability, workflow clarity, and progressive disclosure. It is forked and tuned rather than written from scratch.

Skill quality score — A 0–100 score produced by a reviewer plugin, with a declared threshold that turns it into a gate in CI. It is an entry condition for evaluation, not a substitute for a with/without context eval or a security review, and never the multidimensional eligibility a certification names.

Agent platform — Infrastructure for building and operating agents, including tools, context, memory, identity, routing, and orchestration. It becomes part of a factory only when connected to the engineering operating model.

AI Engineering — The engineering discipline that turns model capability into reliable systems through data, knowledge, semantics, context, agents, tools, structured outputs, routing, loops, evaluations, and runtime controls. Model prompting is one technique within the discipline.

Business Understanding — The discipline of defining the decision, user, owner, outcome, constraints, risk, acceptance criteria, non-goals, and escalation path before designing agent behavior. It prevents technical success from being mistaken for business success.

Model Engineering — The discipline of qualifying and operating versioned model profiles for specific generation, classification, routing, extraction, verification, and reasoning tasks. Model selection is a measured eligibility decision, not a popularity contest.

Agent Engineering — The discipline of binding a role, bounded objective, model profile, tools, skills, context, state, policy, budgets, stop conditions, handoffs, and evaluation into a reproducible Agent Definition. Capability does not grant permission to act.

Harness Engineering 🔑 — The discipline of controlling and recording complete agent sessions through lifecycle hooks, state, checkpoints, tool events, artifacts, receipts, replay, and run comparison. A transcript alone is not a reproducible run record.

Infrastructure Engineering — The discipline of providing environments, compute, queues, concurrency, timeouts, backoff, circuit breaking, failover, idempotency, reconciliation, and recovery for agent execution. It separates platform failure from model or task failure.

Continual Learning — The governed process that converts production signals and feedback into versioned candidate changes, representative evaluations, human promotion decisions, progressive rollout, observation, and rollback. It does not authorize a production system to rewrite itself.

Agent Orchestration — The governed sequencing, routing, coordination, and recovery of agent and deterministic workflow steps through typed state and handoffs. It must preserve scope, authority, budgets, evidence, and stop conditions across every participant.

Five-layer tech stack — The vendor-landscape view of an enterprise agentic system: (1) reliability, evaluation, security, and delivery; (2) knowledge, retrieval, and memory; (3) models, tools, and execution; (4) agent orchestration and runtime; (5) experience and interface. Products fill the layers; the control plane and the Agent Factory sit above them and are owned, not bought (Chapter 38).

AI Infrastructure — The shared model, data, knowledge, tool, identity, runtime, environment, compute, telemetry, and evaluation services used to build and operate AI systems. Infrastructure supplies capabilities; product and control-plane contracts determine their authorized use.

Control plane 🔑 — The authoritative system for intent, policy, identity, authorization, workflow state, approvals, evidence requirements, audit, and governance decisions. It decides what may happen.

Mission Control — The guide's living implementation and case study of an AI Software Factory control plane. It governs Missions, execution admission, verification, evidence, and human authority; it is not the universal definition of a software factory or every component in the execution stack.

Execution plane — The agents, processes, tools, worktrees, CI systems, and deployment systems that perform authorized work. It reports results but does not grant itself authority.

Factory Configuration — A versioned policy envelope connecting a repository to approved workflows, executors, environments, tools, verifiers, budgets, risk boundaries, and recovery limits.

Factory Version — An immutable, activatable snapshot of Factory Configuration and its exact workflow, agent, model-route, harness, sandbox, policy, verifier, budget, and repository bindings. Creation does not establish readiness or authorize execution.

Workflow Contract — A versioned definition of execution nodes or steps, dependencies, input and output schemas, structured completion, failure policy, timeouts, and required gates. It describes permitted orchestration, not the authority to run it for a particular WorkOrder.

Agent Binding — The Attempt-specific association between a workflow role and an exact Agent Definition or version, including its prompt, tool, model, skill, and policy identities. A role name alone is not a reproducible binding.

Compounding Engineering — The governed practice of turning recurring human corrections, friction, failures, and outcomes into evaluated improvements to tests, deterministic controls, documentation, instructions, skills, tools, context, routing, or workflows. Observation may be automated; promotion remains scoped and reviewable.

Definition of Correct 🔑 — A machine-consumable description of acceptable work for a task, component, repository, or domain: requirements, standards, policies, architecture, constraints, acceptance criteria, and verification rules together. What good looks like, written down well enough that an agent and a verifier can both reason about it (Chapter 19).

Skills → loops → factory — The maturity path from codified capability to improving automation to an operating model: L0 AI assistance, L1 skills, L2 automated workflows, L3 loops, L4 factory, L5 adaptive factory. The share of work done by loops rises along a continuum; there is no day the factory is declared complete (Chapters 2, 38).

Four modes of engineering — Traditional (humans build software); agent-assisted (humans build with agents); agentic (humans delegate units of work); factory (humans engineer and govern the system that produces the software) (Chapter 2).

Factory-native SDLC — Intent → shape work → route context, skills, and capability → agent execution with an inner loop → independent verification with an outer loop → risk classification → approval → deploy → observe → meta loop → improve, repeated. The traditional plan-code-review-test-deploy sequence with the loops made explicit (Chapter 2).

Lifecycle above the areas — Signal → intent → factory → outcome → learning, repeated. The six architectural areas (intent, harness, capability, model, trust, learning) live inside the factory step; the data model and control plane sit beneath all of it (Chapter 2).

Three cross-cutting planes — The control plane (inventory, identity, permissions, policy, budgets, deployment, scheduling, observability), the context plane (institutional knowledge, skills, standards, repository intelligence, history, retrieval, lifecycle), and factory engineering (building, measuring, maintaining, and improving the loops) — the three systems that surround the six areas (Chapter 2).

Factory data model 🔑 — The canonical representation of the work: signal → intent → plan → task → attempt → artifact → evidence → verification → decision → deployment → outcome. Agents and models change; these durable objects remain (Chapter 5).

Signal — An observable event indicating a potential need for software change — customer feedback, support, bugs, telemetry, incidents, issues, analytics, security findings, regressions. The factory's boundary is signal-to-outcome, not ticket-to-code (Chapter 26).

Signal intelligence — Ingesting, classifying, correlating, deduplicating, prioritising, and routing signals into actionable factory work: what happened, does it matter, is it a duplicate, who owns it, how severe, should anything change (Chapter 26).

Signal-to-deployment loop — Signals → triage → prioritisation → intent → plan → execution → verification → deployment → production outcomes → new signals. The closed loop the factory runs end to end (Chapter 26).

Work shaping — Turning ambiguous demand into bounded, agent-legible work with explicit goals, constraints, scope, risk, and verification criteria. The human moves from writing implementation to shaping executable intent (Chapters 4, 6).

Product taste — Human judgment about what should exist, which trade-offs matter, what deserves priority, and what a coherent product is. Agents increasingly answer whether something can be built; whether it should be, and what it should be, stays human (Chapter 4).

Factory steward — The person accountable for shaping intent, defining outcomes, holding product and architectural opinions, reviewing exceptions, and improving the factory for a product or domain (Chapter 4).

Software-factory process engineer — An engineer who improves the systems, constraints, feedback, and workflows through which agents produce software, treating a recurring failure as a harness problem rather than fixing the instance again (Chapter 4).

Skill-centric architecture — The skill is the reusable artifact and the loop is an execution mechanism around it, so one skill is consumed by the development agent, code review, CI, maintenance loops, migration agents, and the IDE alike instead of being buried in one workflow (Chapter 12).

Skill drift — A deployed skill that has gone stale relative to its authoritative source, dependencies, policies, or operating environment. Detected by comparing inventory against registry; remedied by upgrade and regression evaluation (Chapter 12).

Skill → verifier pair — A skill says how to do the work; its paired verifier proves it was done. The chain runs Definition of Correct → skill → execution → verifier → evidence → promotion or rework (Chapter 12).

Factory opinion — A reusable, evidence-backed default workflow or architectural choice encoded into the factory yet overridable — between a rigid workflow and a blank general-purpose agent (Chapters 12, 34).

Canonical workflow — A reusable, empirically validated execution pattern for a recurring class of work (code review, incident investigation, dependency upgrade, migration, feature). Specialised in layers — organisation, product, repository, task — rather than duplicated (Chapter 12).

Factory asset lifecycle — Every versioned factory artifact — skills, prompts, policies, tools, MCP servers, repository profiles, harness profiles, workflows, verifiers, evals, models, context sources — has an owner and passes through version → evaluate → deploy → observe → improve → deprecate (Chapter 12).

Historical behaviour mining — Extracting implicit standards and definitions of correctness from PR history, review comments, tickets, incidents, production failures, accepted fixes, and decisions, then codifying a skill, generating an eval, and generating a verifier (Chapter 12).

Factory as code — The whole factory — a manifest plus the agent definitions, skills, MCPs, routing rules, and policies it references — held in versioned files, so it has a measurable baseline, rollback and review, and agents can propose diffs to it (Chapters 34, 41).

Closed-loop factory — Factory infrastructure that is defined as code, lives in the cloud, is driven by APIs rather than a UI, ships with evals, improvement loops, and benchmarks, and is multi-model and multi-agent, so agents and humans can improve it from its own data (Chapter 34).

Factory ownership — Owning a factory means owning what correct means and controlling how work is produced and verified — intent, standards, context, skills, policies, evals, outcomes — while adopting models, runtime components, sandboxes, infrastructure, and commodity tooling (Chapter 13).

Opinionated defaults, open contracts — Strong default workflows for common work alongside portable contracts for models, tools, skills, context, state, and verification: an easy path without lock-in (Chapters 22, 34).

Intelligence commoditisation — The design assumption, not a certainty, that as capable models proliferate, differentiation moves from access to raw intelligence to the systems that apply it: context, workflow, harness, verification, integration, data, policy, learning (Chapter 21).

Three levels of capability — Model capability (what the model can reason about), agent capability (what it accomplishes with tools, context, state, and a loop), factory capability (what an organisation can reliably delegate with workflows, governance, verification, economics, and learning). Each is larger than the last only if the layer around it is built (Chapter 16).

Tools, context, models, and interoperability

Tool 🔑 — A typed executable capability through which an agent observes or changes an external system. A tool supplies capability; policy and credentials determine whether a particular call is authorized.

Tool calling — The moment an agent asks for an external action — a search, a query, a file write, a message — as a typed call the harness executes on its behalf. The call is where authority is checked; the model only proposes it.

Tool gateway — A single entry point through which every tool and MCP server, internal or third-party, is reached, so that authentication, policy, tenant scoping, logging, and cost attribution are enforced once. Exposing tools through a gateway is also what makes CLI tool resolution and code-mode possible.

CLI tool resolution — Reaching tools by executing a shell command that resolves and invokes the tool against the gateway at call time, instead of loading every tool's schema into the model's context. It removes tool-schema overhead from every turn; it does not change what the tool is authorized to do.

Tool search — Letting the model search a tool catalog and load only the definitions it needs for the task at hand, so a library of thousands of tools does not consume context or degrade selection accuracy.

Code-mode — Running a chatty sequence of tool actions (submit, poll, fetch) as one script in a subprocess, returning only the summary to the model's context. It removes polling turns and intermediate payloads from the loop; the actions themselves remain subject to the same authorization.

Context graph — A queryable graph of an organization's engineering entities and their relationships (services, teams, incidents, pull requests, design documents, deployments, datasets, table usage) that any agent can consult in natural language before acting. Grounding through it is the main lever on requests per turn; it is knowledge, not authority.

Model Context Protocol (MCP) 🔑 — An interoperability protocol for exposing tools, resources, prompts, and negotiated extensions between hosts and servers. MCP standardizes communication and discovery; it does not by itself establish tenant isolation, trustworthy tool behavior, least privilege, or acceptance.

MCP Task — A protocol-extension handle used to manage a long-running MCP operation. It is not the same as a factory Task: the domain Task organizes authorized WorkOrder execution and retains business and acceptance lineage.

Agent Client Protocol (ACP) — An editor-to-agent interoperability protocol for portable coding-agent sessions and interaction. The acronym is ambiguous outside this usage, so implementations must pin the specification and version. ACP does not establish factory workflow authority or acceptance.

Agent–User Interaction Protocol (AG-UI) — An event-oriented protocol for connecting an agent backend to a user-facing application through lifecycle, message, tool, state, and interaction events. It does not make UI state the authoritative factory state.

Channel adapter — A versioned boundary that normalizes chat, email, voice, portal, API, or agent-to-agent input into the factory's common intake contract while preserving authenticated and represented identity, source-message and transformation provenance, correlation, and reply destination. It translates protocol and presentation; it does not grant authority or bypass admission.

Agent2Agent Protocol (A2A) — An interoperability protocol through which independent agent applications can discover capabilities, exchange messages, delegate work, and manage remote tasks. Delegation through A2A cannot widen a WorkOrder's authority or make a remote agent trustworthy by default.

Data Understanding — The discipline of determining whether source data is complete, current, valid, consistent, attributable, permitted, and fit for a particular decision. It precedes retrieval and model reasoning.

Data Contract — A versioned agreement describing a data source's schema, semantics, owner, quality thresholds, freshness, lineage, sensitivity, allowed uses, and failure behavior. A contract does not guarantee that current data actually satisfies it.

Knowledge Engineering — The governed lifecycle that registers sources and turns approved data and documents into normalized, indexed, retrievable, correctable, and traceable knowledge. It prepares reusable knowledge; it does not decide the final context for one Attempt.

Semantic Engineering — The design and operation of controlled vocabulary, canonical identities, aliases, relationships, mappings, disambiguation, and meaning across sources and systems. It prevents the factory from treating raw string similarity as shared meaning.

Semantic Contract — A versioned agreement defining canonical concepts, identifiers, aliases, relationships, disambiguation rules, source mappings, ownership, and compatibility. A semantic change can invalidate retrieval, context, evaluation, and evidence that depended on the prior meaning.

Controlled vocabulary — A versioned set of preferred domain terms, definitions, aliases, and deprecated terms. It is the smallest useful semantic control and need not become a full ontology.

Ontology — A formal model of domain concepts, relationships, and constraints. It is useful when explicit semantic reasoning and integration justify its modeling and maintenance cost.

Ontology maturity level — An evidence-based rating for one domain and workload: L1 Foundation, L2 Owned Domains, L3 Executable Contracts, L4 Governed Operations, or L5 Governed Adaptation. The level is the highest one whose full exit evidence exists; graph size, formalism, and agent count do not raise it.

Entity resolution — The process of determining when source-specific names or identifiers refer to the same canonical entity while preserving provenance, uncertainty, and correction history.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) 🔑 — A pattern in which model input is augmented with information retrieved from external sources. RAG does not by itself establish source quality, permission, freshness, semantic correctness, or grounded output.

Hybrid retrieval — Candidate retrieval that combines complementary methods, commonly lexical, vector, metadata, and relationship-based search. Its value must be measured against the target query distribution.

Reranking — A second-stage method that reorders retrieved candidates for a specific query or task. Reranking cannot recover a required item that candidate retrieval omitted.

Context engineering — The design and operation of selecting, filtering, ordering, budgeting, refreshing, and attributing the information available to an agent for one task. More context is not automatically better context.

Context Package — An immutable, provenance-backed, budgeted set of code, documents, decisions, history, and retrieval results frozen for one Attempt. It is a versioned, addressable unit that may carry a declared type such as skill, rule, documentation, workflow, tool guide, or prompt template. It is advisory input and cannot silently change approved intent, grant authority, or satisfy an acceptance criterion.

Context compaction — The controlled replacement of a growing working context with a smaller representation that preserves governing instructions, accepted decisions, unresolved issues, evidence links, and necessary state. Compaction is lossy and must not silently rewrite authority.

Memory — Durable information retained across runs, such as accepted decisions, outcomes, failures, preferences, and recovery patterns. Memory is a potentially stale or poisoned context source, not an authority record.

Working Memory — Short-lived task and conversation state required for the current run, including intermediate artifacts and tool results. It should be cleared, compacted, or deliberately persisted when the run ends.

Episodic Memory — Attributable records of past events and experiences, including when they occurred and which outcome followed. A prior episode is evidence about history, not a universal instruction.

Semantic Memory — Durable facts, concepts, and relationships retrieved by meaning. Similarity does not prove truth, freshness, permission, or authority.

Procedural Memory — Versioned reusable knowledge about how to perform a task, normally expressed as a skill, workflow, runbook, or instruction set. It must be evaluated and lifecycle governed.

Temporal Memory — Time-aware facts and relationships that preserve when a claim was valid and how it changed. It prevents a current answer from silently combining incompatible historical states.

Model gateway — The governed interface that normalizes provider access, identity, credentials, policy, telemetry, quotas, and failure handling. It separates product workflows from provider-specific APIs.

Reasoning effort — The thinking budget granted to a model invocation. Output and reasoning tokens bill at multiples of input tokens, so the effort default is a cost lever set by policy per task class, raised only where measured quality demands it (Chapter 23).

Hallucination — A confident, fluent output that is not grounded in the context or the world. In a factory it is treated as an evidence problem, not a model problem: nothing a model asserts is accepted until an independent check has proven it, and grounding through trusted context is the first control.

Model catalog — A scoped inventory of available model routes and their capabilities, constraints, cost, latency, availability, security classification, qualification evidence, and lifecycle status. Registration does not imply production eligibility.

Exact model route — A digest-bound execution identity that includes the provider route, model, harness adapter and configuration, and runtime artifact. It prevents a familiar model name from hiding materially different execution.

Model router — A policy-governed decision component that filters ineligible routes, ranks eligible routes using quality, latency, cost, security, context, availability, and historical outcomes, and records the applied decision and fallback. Routing cannot override admission or acceptance policy.

Task-Specific Agent Profile — A versioned eligibility template that binds the capabilities required for a task class to approved model routes, instructions, tools, skills, context policy, harness features, budgets, and verification. It is not permission to execute a particular WorkOrder.

Conditional routing — Selection of the next eligible agent, model, tool, workflow node, fallback, or human decision from observable state and policy. Model classification may inform the decision but cannot bypass deterministic eligibility.

Agent contract — The stable interface a harness exposes to the control plane regardless of which vendor loop runs inside it: manifest in, ordered events and completion report out, with cancellation, budgets, and lifecycle hooks. The organization owns the contract and adopts the loop mechanics behind it.

Workload taxonomy 🔑 — The classification of tasks by complexity, risk, latency, security sensitivity, and required capability that routing policy is written against. A task class, not a prompt, is the unit routing decides on.

Routing trace — The per-call record of which model route was selected, why (policy, capability match, budget), which candidates and fallbacks were considered, and which one actually ran. It lets a quality or cost question be traced to a routing decision rather than to "the model."

Canary evaluation — Exposing a bounded cohort of real work to a candidate model route, skill, or configuration with a risk stop and rollback ready, and measuring outcomes before widening. It is the last rung of the promotion ladder, not a substitute for the offline rungs.

Shadow mode — Running a candidate route, policy, or reviewer on live inputs while computing but not enforcing its decisions, so that disagreement with the incumbent can be measured. See shadow testing (candidates) and shadow governance (policy decisions); a shadow mode nobody reads is a delay.

Deterministic preprocessing — Static analysis, linting, type checking, security scanning, tests, policy checks, change classification, and dependency analysis run before any model is invoked, so that inference is spent only on what software cannot decide reliably. The sequence is deterministic → cheap model → specialised model → frontier model.

Repository profile 🔑 — The versioned readiness record for one repository: languages, build and test systems, ownership, conventions, architectural boundaries, hot paths, defect history, risk classification, admitted workflows, and learned lessons. One shared platform, many profiles; not one universal agent and not one model per repository.

Changed-symbol retrieval — Retrieving context by the functions, types, and modules a change actually touches, plus their dependents, rather than by similarity to the diff text. It is how review and implementation context stays minimal and relevant across a large codebase.

Trained adapter — A small set of additional weights trained on top of a frozen base model so that a tuned behaviour can be attached, versioned, and detached without retraining, and so the base model stays replaceable underneath it. Distinct from a model adapter (Chapter 11, Chapter 21), which is the per-provider translation layer that lets one calling convention reach many models — a trained adapter changes what a model has learned; a model adapter changes how it is called.

Context as code 🔑 — Treating agent context — skills, rules, instructions, policies, repository guidance — like source: versioned, reviewed, tested, evaluated, owned, distributed, deprecated, drift-detected, measured, and rolled back (Chapter 20).

Context lifecycle management — Create → review → version → distribute → execute → observe → evaluate → improve → deprecate, applied to every unit of context; the Context CDL is the enforced implementation (Chapter 20).

Context inventory — A continuously maintained inventory of skills, instruction files, prompts, policies, MCP configurations, agent definitions, repository guidance, standards, and plugin configurations, used to detect duplicate, stale, conflicting, missing, unowned, outdated, or unsafe context (Chapter 20).

Context drift — Divergence between documented agent instructions and the actual software, architecture, standards, or environment — a skill still says Framework X after the organisation moved to Y (Chapter 20).

Context deduplication — Discover → compare → consolidate → establish a source of truth → distribute, so four competing security-review skills become one definition of correct (Chapter 20).

Context utility — The measured contribution of a context source to agent performance: the task with the source versus without, in quality, success, latency, and cost. Sources that do not earn their place are pruned (Chapter 20).

Context pruning — Removing stale, redundant, low-value, or misleading knowledge from what agents can reach. More knowledge is more noise unless it is curated (Chapter 20).

Compensatory context — Context created to work around a temporary model weakness. Expected to be short-lived and re-evaluated as models improve; see harness debt (Chapters 16, 20).

Institutional context — Durable organisational knowledge — architecture, policies, standards, terminology, security requirements, workflows, product and design principles, conventions — that no model will inherently know: how this organisation builds software (Chapter 20).

Company brain — A governed enterprise knowledge layer from which agents retrieve organisational context: code, history, PRs, tickets, chat, documents, decisions, runbooks, incidents, requirements, policies, standards. Its value is measured by context utility, not by breadth (Chapter 20).

Context routing — Deciding which context a task receives — skills, policies, architecture, repository context, history — from its classification. A routing system distinct from model routing (Chapter 20).

Context shift-left — Giving the producing agent the same standard the reviewer would apply, so work is generated correctly and review becomes defence in depth rather than the primary teaching mechanism (Chapters 20, 39).

Context firewall (context isolation) — An intentional information boundary between agents in different roles — creator and verifier, planner and executor, executor and security reviewer, customer data and general worker — to preserve independence, reduce bias, and enforce least privilege (Chapter 20).

Fresh-context verification — Verification run from a clean context, given only the goal, the artifact, and the verification contract, so the verifier reconstructs correctness instead of inheriting the producer's assumptions (Chapters 20, 27).

Structured external state — Persistent information outside model weights and transient context — preferences, skills, policies, plans, repository profiles, decisions, outcomes, factory state — named by kind rather than lumped as memory (Chapter 20).

Memory taxonomy — Working (current execution), episodic (past executions and outcomes), semantic (facts and organisational knowledge), procedural (skills and workflows), preference (user and team choices), and durable factory state (plans, checkpoints, attempts, approvals, artifacts) (Chapter 20).

Institutional knowledge representation — A maintained representation of architecture, history, decisions, and conventions optimised for its reader. The human representation and the agent representation are different artifacts (Chapter 19).

Canonical knowledge structure — An opinionated representation of a domain's knowledge built around its recurring questions — for software: architecture, components, interfaces, dependencies, ownership, history, decisions, conventions (Chapter 19).

Harness profile — A model-specific configuration of how the common harness works with a model family: tool schemas, edit mechanism, prompt structure, context strategy, compaction, reasoning configuration, subagent behaviour, retries, escalation. Canonical agent contract → harness profile → model (Chapter 16).

Harness–model co-design — Optimising the harness around each model's behaviour, tool-use patterns, and reasoning style while keeping the platform contracts common. Model-agnostic is not model-uniform (Chapter 16).

Performance equation — Observed agent performance is a property of model × harness × workflow × context × tools × feedback × verification. Never attribute a success or failure to the model alone (Chapter 16).

Harness as intelligence multiplier — A harness does not merely invoke a model; it multiplies the model's usefulness by supplying workflow, context, tools, feedback, verification, and adaptation. Model capability ≠ agent capability ≠ factory capability (Chapter 16).

Universal meta-harness — An execution system that constructs or selects the workflow needed for a defined outcome — given goal, constraints, and a verification contract it chooses decomposition, workers, skills, strategy, and verification — instead of running a predetermined sequence (Chapters 13, 15).

Outcome-driven execution — Execution governed by verifiable desired outcomes rather than prescribed steps: produce X subject to Y and prove conditions A–F before completion (Chapter 13).

Agent effectiveness — The measured ability of an agent configuration to reach accepted outcomes across the organisation's real workload distribution at acceptable quality, latency, and cost — not its rank on a public benchmark (Chapter 22).

Workload distribution — The actual distribution of task types, complexity, risk, domains, and execution patterns an organisation's agents encounter; the target routing and evaluation optimise against (Chapter 22).

Dynamic intelligence escalation — Upgrading to a more capable model during execution when evidence shows the current capability is unlikely to succeed efficiently; its inverse, intelligence downgrading, hands mechanical remainders to a cheaper model or a deterministic tool. Together, adaptive routing during execution (Chapter 22).

Cache-aware routing — Including cache value, switching cost, compaction cost, expected remaining work, and success probability in the routing decision, because the cheapest model is not cheapest if switching destroys context state (Chapter 22).

Intelligence budget — The amount and class of reasoning allocated to an outcome by its complexity, risk, and value: a rename gets a cheap model, a feature a specialised one, a cross-system architecture change a frontier model, a security-critical migration a frontier model plus multiple validators (Chapter 22).

Parallel candidate execution — Running independent agents on the same problem and selecting, combining, or verifying their results. Worth it only when outcome value exceeds the added inference cost; correlated candidates add cost without independence (Chapter 22).

Agent affordance — An interface or property deliberately built to make a capability easier and safer for agents: a CLI or API instead of a UI, a structured query instead of raw logs, an environment manifest, structured errors (Chapter 26).

Governed delivery records

Company — The top-level organizational and accountability boundary.

Workspace — An isolated operating scope containing authorized people, repositories, configuration, and factory records.

Repository — The registered source-control target against which work may be authorized. A repository record does not itself permit modification.

Host binding — The record that names the runtime host, sandbox, or execution backend authorized to act on a Repository, with its own readiness state. Dispatch is blocked until an active host binding and a code scope exist; a Repository without one is authorized work with nowhere it may lawfully run.

Code scope — The governed allowlist of repository paths (typically monorepo paths) inside which an Attempt may change files. It is frozen into the execution manifest, enforced at dispatch, and re-checked against changed files before a pull request is review-ready.

Portable repository identity — A repository identity owned by the organization and separate from any developer's local checkout, so that scope, policy, readiness, and lineage attach to the repository rather than to a path on one machine. It is what lets many workers, hosts, and sandboxes refer to the same governed target.

Repository Readiness Record — A versioned assessment of repository identity, ownership, instructions, architecture, dependencies, build, tests, delivery, data, security, environment, and eligible workflow classes. It is scoped and expiring; registration alone does not establish readiness.

Instruction resolution — The onboarding step that reads every instruction file a repository carries and resolves them into one declared precedence order, so that when two files disagree the winner is recorded rather than chosen silently at run time.

Architecture mapping — The onboarding step that produces a repository's component, boundary, entry-point, and data-flow view by combining human- authored architecture documents with generated maps and surfacing where they conflict.

Build/test topology — The discovered map of which build targets exist, which test suites cover which targets, how long each takes, and which are known to be flaky, so a planner can select the cheapest sufficient verification.

Codebase indexing — The pipeline that turns source, instructions, architecture, and build/test topology into queryable indexes (symbols, dependencies, ownership, test-to-code mapping, hotspots) with source commit, method, confidence, and expiry recorded on every derived view.

Documentation maintenance workflow — The catalog workflow that begins from a system, policy, interface, or workflow change, identifies affected guidance, updates it, verifies commands, links, schemas, and examples, and publishes under governance. Semantic correctness still needs an accountable owner.

Codebase intelligence — Derived, attributable views such as symbol, dependency, ownership, build, test-impact, change-history, and architecture indexes created from exact source versions. Derived intelligence is not an authority record and must expose freshness and uncertainty.

Workflow Catalog — The governed inventory of supported factory workflow products, including trigger, owner, inputs, eligible scope, capabilities, authority, evidence, recovery, outcomes, measures, and maturity.

Autonomous backlog — A policy-bounded set of eligible, owned work from which the factory may recommend or select execution according to value, urgency, risk, dependencies, capacity, and work-in-progress limits. It does not grant agents product-priority authority.

Goal — The strategic result one or more Missions serve, sitting above the Mission in the hierarchy. A Goal owns an outcome and never execution state: it has no budget to spend, no acceptance criteria an agent can satisfy, and it is not done because its Missions are.

Mission — A durable governed outcome. It owns the objective, business reason, constraints, risk, acceptance criteria, and accountable owner. It is not an agent session or task list.

Plan — A versioned proposal for achieving a Mission. Approval freezes and authorizes an exact plan version. Plan approval does not dispatch work, merge code, or deploy software.

Specification baseline — An approved, immutable version of requirements, criteria, assertions, assumptions, constraints, and rationale. A material change creates a new baseline and triggers impact analysis.

Invariant — A condition that must remain true across all permitted states and transitions, such as tenant isolation or the prohibition on accepting a WorkOrder from a stale Attempt.

WorkOrder — The bounded unit of engineering authority and acceptance. It defines permitted scope, repositories, tools, agents, constraints, risk, budget, acceptance criteria, quality gates, and required evidence.

Task — A bounded operational unit used to organize authorized WorkOrder execution. Task completion does not accept the parent WorkOrder.

Attempt — One immutable execution try for a Task or WorkOrder. Retries create new Attempts so history and causality are preserved.

Run (agent turn) — One low-level agent turn beneath an Attempt: a model call, its tool invocations, and its observations, recorded in order with a sequence number. An Attempt contains many Runs; a Run never needs approval and never decides the Attempt's outcome. "The run finished" is not "the Attempt completed".

Evidence 🔑 — An attributable receipt or artifact that supports or refutes an acceptance criterion. Useful evidence identifies the verifier, method, environment, source commit, artifact, time, and result.

Pull Request — The review boundary that packages proposed repository changes and their source lineage. An open or passing pull request does not prove Mission acceptance or production value.

Release — A governed progression of an accepted change through merge, deployment, activation, observation, rollback readiness, and production verification. These states should not be compressed into “done.”

Authoritative states — The seven state machines a control plane keeps, one per record, with the rules that relate them. Mission: DRAFT, PLANNING, AWAITING_PLAN_APPROVAL, READY, IN_PROGRESS, BLOCKED, AWAITING_VALIDATION, AWAITING_ACCEPTANCE, DONE, CANCELED, SUPERSEDED. Plan: DRAFT, PROPOSED, APPROVED, REJECTED, SUPERSEDED. WorkOrder: DRAFT, READY, DISPATCHED, IN_PROGRESS, BLOCKED, AWAITING_APPROVAL, AWAITING_VERIFICATION, REOPENED, DONE, CANCELED, SUPERSEDED. Task: INBOX, READY, IN_PROGRESS, REVIEW, NEEDS_APPROVAL, BLOCKED, DONE, FAILED, CANCELED. Attempt: queued, running, paused, completed, failed, canceled, timeout. Verification: PENDING, PASS, FAIL, WAIVED, STALE (plus VERIFIED, UNKNOWN, MISSING in a review package). Approval: NOT_REQUIRED, PENDING, APPROVED, REJECTED, CONDITIONAL, EXPIRED. No state implies the next; Task Done ≠ WorkOrder accepted ≠ engine done ≠ Definition of Done; a failed Attempt does not make the Task terminal while recovery is active; none of UNKNOWN, MISSING, PENDING, FAILED, or STALE is success.

Governance concepts

Policy 🔑 — A versioned rule that determines whether an action is permitted, blocked, or requires approval based on identity, scope, risk, evidence, and environment.

Approval — A human decision granting a specific authority or accepting a specific risk. Approval must identify its subject, scope, version, conditions, owner, and validity window.

Acceptance — The governed decision that an outcome satisfies its defined criteria. Execution completion and acceptance are different events.

Builder loop — The delivery chain seen from the builder's chair: Intent → Plan → Configure agents, harnesses, skills, and tools → Execute → Verify and evaluate → Deliver → Observe → Improve. It is the same chain the governed delivery lifecycle enforces record by record, at a coarser zoom; each arrow is a gate, not an optimistic handoff.

Exception-first (operator surface) — The design rule that a default operator view shows decisions, blockers, failed or stale evidence, unsafe conditions, and aging work first, ranked by risk, urgency, age, and evidence state, while routine activity remains available for inspection. Its opposite is an activity feed, which measures messages, tokens, or generated code and trains the operator to stop looking.

Independent validation 🔑 — Evaluation performed through a separate execution and evidence path from the implementation that produced the change. Different people are useful but not sufficient; technical separation is the core control.

Validator — An authorized actor or system that evaluates frozen criteria against exact artifacts and emits independent evidence. A validator does not alter the implementation it is certifying.

Risk Review — A governed escalation created when evidence is conflicting, missing, unusual, or materially risky. Validator disagreement increases governance; it is not resolved by majority vote.

Review package — A concise decision packet containing the original intent, approved plan, changed scope, technical decisions, criterion-level evidence, risks, deviations, uncertainty, rollback approach, and exact source lineage. Built for evidence-first human review (sometimes called Review Intelligence), it reads in a fixed order: frozen intent, criteria → checks, failures and retries, Decision Candidates, changed-file groups, and optional residual findings labelled ADVISORY.

Decision packet — An operator-facing explanation of the exact decision required, why automation stopped, affected scope, risk, available and missing evidence, safe options, recommendation, uncertainty, deadline, and what resumes after the decision.

Operator attention contract — The rule that a factory interrupts a person only when judgment, authority, or credentials are required, and that every interruption arrives as a decision packet stating the decision, why, risk, evidence, options, and what resumes after. Progress and routine completion stay in the record and out of the inbox.

Human touch — Any manual override, approval, or takeover during agent execution. Some touches are authority working as designed; many are the platform failing. Human touches per agent task is the Factory Health measure of leverage.

Overnight continuity — The property that governed work survives a model change, a context-window limit, a process restart, a worker handoff, and the end of the chat session that started it, continuing under bounded retries and escalating when the bound is hit rather than looping silently. A Mission carries a stop condition before its Plan is compiled for this reason.

Risk-proportional autonomy (GREEN / YELLOW / RED) — The pairing of each risk band with what may proceed without a human, classified by the policy engine: GREEN bounded reversible work proceeds automatically to a review-ready pull request; YELLOW needs Plan approval and merge approval; RED runs in a restricted sandbox with additional reviewers. Merge is human-only in a first version in every band.

Experience level — A presentation setting (Basic, Intermediate, Advanced) that controls how much of the factory a builder is shown. It never changes permissions, the executor, the evidence required, or who may accept.

Waiver — An authorized decision that a failed or missing check will not block this decision, recorded as WAIVED with owner, reason, scope, and expiry. It is never silently rendered as PASS, and policy may still block acceptance or refuse the waiver for that class of check.

Supervised autonomy — The operating mode in which an agent proposes an action and waits for human approval before it takes effect. The default for consequential or irreversible actions; the approval is a server-enforced authority boundary, never a decorative UI state.

Escalation design — The rules for when an agent stops and hands the decision to a person: which conditions trigger it, who receives it, what evidence travels with it, and what the agent may do meanwhile. See Escalation UX for the surface; see Risk Review for the record.

Consent fatigue — The failure mode in which people approve so many prompts that they stop reading them, turning human approval into a rubber stamp. The remedy is risk-proportional review — fewer, richer decision packets — not more prompts.

Governance agent — An agent whose job is to check other agents against policy: scope, budgets, evidence currentness, prohibited actions. It observes and flags; it never becomes the authority that accepts, promotes, or waives.

Scope boundary — The exact set of systems, data, repositories, code paths, and actions an agent may touch, resolved before execution and enforced at the gateway. Anything outside it does not exist for the agent.

Human-in-the-loop 🔑 — An operating mode in which a person performs a required decision, approval, correction, or risk judgment inside the workflow. Human presence is useful only when the decision and evidence are explicit.

Human-on-the-loop — An operating mode in which bounded work proceeds under policy while a person supervises outcomes and handles exceptions. Supervision does not mean reading every agent action.

Human-out-of-the-loop — An operating mode in which one bounded workflow instance can complete without an in-run human decision. Prior human policy, accountability, incident response, and promotion authority still apply.

Meaningful human control — A human decides where the decision is consequential, with enough information, time, and authority for the decision to be real rather than ceremonial, and retains override and abort at every point.

Human override and abort — The standing ability of an accountable human to countermand a decision the system made or to stop a run in flight, without needing anyone's permission to do so. It is a control with a named owner, not a courtesy.

Approval inbox — The single queue where every pending decision packet waits, sorted by risk and expiry, so a decision owner sees what needs them in one place rather than across chat, pull-request tabs, and email.

Escalation UX — The design of the moment a surprise reaches a person: what happened, what the system already did, what it is asking for, and what happens if nobody answers before the deadline.

Operator cognitive load — The attention a human must spend to make a sound decision. Every packet that arrives without a clear question, or that repeats a check a gate should have made, spends the budget and buys nothing.

Audit export — A packaged, tamper-evident extract of control lineage (decisions, denials, grants, exceptions, overrides, revocations) for a defined scope and period, in a form an auditor can read without access to the factory's internal stores.

Attention Budget — The expected and permitted human effort for a workflow, including review, correction, approvals, escalation, and context reconstruction. It is an operating metric, not permission to skip consequential judgment.

Engineering Attention Altitude — The level at which a human inspects and directs work, ranging from implementation details through components, workflows, systems, and business outcomes. Attention moves upward only when risk, evaluated coverage, evidence, and recovery justify reduced direct inspection; it moves downward when novelty or consequence increases.

Change classification — Typing a change before review — kind, surface touched, size, blast radius — from the diff and the codebase index, so that the risk tier, the reviewers, and the budget are selected by what the change is rather than applied uniformly.

Hierarchical context 🔑 — Review or execution context assembled in layers — organisation-wide standards, product-line conventions, repository-specific rules and history — with the more specific layer overriding the general one and every layer versioned.

Budget-aware escalation — A reviewer or agent that runs under a token, time, and cost budget set by risk tier and, when the budget is exhausted or confidence is below threshold, stops and hands what it found to a person rather than manufacturing a verdict.

Structured finding — A typed review record: location, category, severity from consequence × likelihood, evidence, suggested fix, and the reviewer and index versions that produced it. Countable, deduplicable, evaluable, and usable by the next agent; a free-text comment is none of these.

Change-risk policy — A repository-owned, executable rule that decides whether a pull request needs a human reviewer, judging the change (blast radius, paths touched, novelty) rather than the code. It is the risk-tier assignment made runnable, and it is kept separate from the file invariants a verifier checks.

Policy hook — A named point in the lifecycle (before dispatch, before a side-effecting tool call, before publication, merge, release, promotion, and on resume) where the orchestrator stops, hands state and proposed effect to the policy engine, and proceeds only with a recorded allow, deny, or condition. A hook that does not persist its decision and policy version is decorative.

Merge authority — The grant to move a reviewed candidate into the trunk, held by the repository's owners and exercised by a human on a decision packet. It is distinct from release authority; a merge is not a deployment decision.

Release authority — The grant to expose a merged change to users, held by whoever owns the service's availability and risk, often a different person and policy from merge authority, and exercised through controlled rollout over a bounded blast radius.

Regression gate — The evidence a promotion hook demands: the candidate, compared with the current baseline on the frozen evaluation set, may not fall below declared thresholds on any protected measure, and no aggregate improvement excuses a failed hard gate.

Risk-based autonomy 🔑 — Agent authority and required oversight set by the risk of the proposed action: documentation auto-merges; tests auto-merge after verification; internal tooling gets automated review with sampled human review; customer-facing production needs human approval; auth, security, and data need specialised verification and mandatory approval (Chapter 7).

Change risk classification — Evaluating a proposed change — files, dependencies, component criticality, security sensitivity, blast radius, size, test coverage, agent confidence, historical failure rate — to assign a risk tier that drives verification depth, reviewer, approval, deployment policy, and model spend (Chapter 7).

Human judgment boundary — The points that stay human on purpose because they need taste, ambiguity resolution, accountability, prioritisation, novel synthesis, or risk acceptance: product direction, architectural trade-offs, high-risk changes, ambiguous requirements, policy exceptions. The aim is to move humans to the highest-value judgments (Chapter 7).

Cost-bounded autonomy — Autonomy permitted while execution stays inside quality, risk, and economic boundaries — complete the migration autonomously up to a budget, then escalate. Risk boundary, verification boundary, economic boundary (Chapter 7).

Review bottleneck — The constraint that appears when agent production exceeds human capacity to inspect and approve it. The bottleneck migrates from writing code to reviewing it to defining correctness, verification, and exceptions (Chapter 39).

Review compression — Removing low-value review work before an artifact reaches a person: inner-loop checks, deterministic verification, specialised verifiers, agent reviewers, risk classification, then human judgment only where necessary (Chapter 39).

Specialised review lens — A targeted review capability activated by the characteristics of a change — frontend gets accessibility, design system, and UI architecture; backend gets API, reliability, data, performance; authentication gets security and identity; infrastructure gets security, cost, reliability (Chapter 39).

Agent-legible workflow — A workflow whose intent, execution, feedback, decisions, and outcomes exist as structured, retrievable artifacts: ticket is intent, PR is proposed change, comments are feedback, CI is verification, merge is accepted outcome, incident is delayed outcome (Chapter 26).

Quality and assurance concepts

Quality Contract — A versioned, machine-readable specification of the requirements, constraints, risks, verification methods, evidence, hard gates, approvals, release policy, and production signals required for one WorkOrder or release candidate. It defines what “done” means before execution.

Validation assertion — A stable, testable claim derived from a requirement. It identifies the expected outcome, method, pass condition, required evidence, independence, and waiver policy.

Verification receipt — An immutable record that a known verifier applied a defined method to an exact artifact and observed a result in a defined context. It is an observation, not the acceptance decision.

Trajectory evaluation — Evaluation of how an Attempt reached its output, including its context, tool calls, permissions, policy decisions, budgets, recovery, and stop behavior. A correct artifact does not excuse an unauthorized or materially unsafe trajectory.

Verification Run — One immutable evaluation of a versioned verification contract against an exact candidate and manifest. A rerun creates a new record; it does not replace the history of an errored or failing run.

Evals 🔑 — Shorthand for structured evaluation: representative tasks, graders, and comparisons that measure whether an agent, skill, or model change actually works, with and without the change. See Evaluation Engineering, Eval Task, Evaluation Run, and Context eval.

Evaluation Engineering — The discipline of designing representative tasks, fixtures, datasets, trials, graders, metrics, comparisons, and promotion rules for probabilistic system behavior. It complements artifact verification and product validation rather than replacing them.

AI eval — A bounded evaluation of a versioned AI-system configuration on representative tasks using explicit graders and metrics. This guide uses the more precise records Eval Task, Trial, Evaluation Dataset, Evaluation Run, and Promotion Decision instead of treating “evals” as one undifferentiated test.

Eval Task — One versioned evaluation case containing an objective, initial state, constraints, criteria, expected evidence, and cleanup. It is a test input, not a production WorkOrder.

Evaluation Dataset — An immutable, provenance-backed set of Eval Tasks with membership, slices, inclusion and exclusion rules, contamination controls, classification, and ownership.

Evaluation Run — A versioned set of Trials executed for one baseline or candidate under comparable conditions, with task- and slice-level results, uncertainty, grader versions, cost, artifacts, and a promotion recommendation.

Trial — One execution of one evaluated configuration against one Eval Task. Repeated trials remain separate observations so consistency and variance can be measured.

Repeated trials — Several independent executions of the same candidate on the same task, so that variance becomes a measured quantity and the reported result is a distribution rather than an anecdote.

Baseline versus candidate — The basic shape of every evaluation decision: the configuration currently trusted compared against the one proposing to replace it, on the same tasks and fixtures, with uncertainty reported and segmented by slice.

Dataset governance — Running an evaluation dataset as a product: a named owner, an intake gate, immutable versions, access rules per split, contamination tracking, and a retirement path.

Benchmark contamination — Dataset contamination where the leak is into a public or shared benchmark: a task or its answer has reached the model's training data, prompts, skills, or memory, so a score no longer measures generalization.

Adversarial evaluation — Running a candidate against inputs designed to make it misbehave, including injected instructions in repository files, conflicting tool results, and tasks whose correct answer is to refuse or escalate.

Safety evaluation — Measuring whether a candidate stays inside its authorization envelope under adversarial and ordinary conditions: no unauthorized effects, no secret exposure, no evidence fabrication. Its findings are hard gates, not scores.

Shadow testing — Running a candidate on production-shaped inputs without granting it any authoritative effect, so its outputs can be compared to the baseline's before anything ships. Also called shadow evaluation.

Grader — A versioned deterministic, model-based, or human method that evaluates defined assertions and emits criterion-level findings. A grader's output is itself subject to calibration, provenance, and independence concerns.

LLM-as-judge (also LLM-as-a-judge) — A model-based grader used for bounded qualities that are difficult to express deterministically. It must be calibrated against human-labelled references for bias, disagreement, presentation sensitivity, and correlated failure, and it never owns a hard gate.

Outcome evaluation — Grading whether the result was right: criteria met, tests passed, change accepted. Independent of trajectory evaluation (whether the path was acceptable); a good outcome must never average away a bad path.

Escaped defect — A defect that passed every gate and was found in production. The most valuable evaluation content a factory owns: each one becomes a permanent regression case, and the escaped-defect rate is what re-anchors every proxy measure.

Builder acceptance — The person who asked for a change accepted it without rework. A stronger outcome proxy than task success and a weaker one than escaped defects, because acceptance can happen under deadline or miss a defect.

Actionable-comment acceptance — For review agents, the fraction of findings a human acted on rather than dismissed. It measures whether findings were worth attention, not whether they were correct; joined to outcomes it becomes the reviewer's precision.

Human-review baseline — The measured precision, recall, and time-to-review of human-only review for a class of change, taken before an automated reviewer is introduced and refreshed periodically. A reviewer is promoted from advisory to gate mode, and demoted, against it.

Production outcome (final grader) — What a change did for the customer and the service once live. Every other measure is a proxy chosen because production is slow to speak; when a proxy and production disagree, production wins and the proxy is recalibrated.

Trace replay — Read-only inspection or re-emission of retained run events for diagnosis and testing. It does not recreate external effects or prove the original outcome again.

Execution replay — A new Attempt that reconstructs an earlier manifest, fixture, environment, and dependencies as closely as possible. Divergence is a new observation; the original history remains immutable.

Run comparison — A structured comparison of baseline and candidate runs across configuration, trajectory, artifact, criteria, cost, latency, policy, recovery, and human intervention. Aggregate improvement cannot override a hard gate or severe slice regression.

Reproduction — A versioned procedure and fixture that demonstrates an observed failure under stated conditions with expected and actual behavior. A generated reproduction requires independent confirmation before it authorizes corrective work.

Reproduction generation — The agent workflow that turns an untrusted feedback report into a runnable, repeatable failing case the factory owns, typically by generating several candidates and verifying them on a separate path before any earns standing.

Difficulty classification — Triage that assigns severity (how bad for users), priority (how soon the organization wants a fix), and difficulty (how much work the fix is expected to take). It is an agent task with an evaluation behind it and a deterministic correction from the size of the fix that actually landed.

Regression asset — A retained test or Eval Task derived from a confirmed failure and bound to its issue, expected behavior, owner, scope, and lifecycle. It should be quarantined explicitly if it becomes unreliable.

Automated PR Review Agent — A versioned agent configuration that evaluates a pull request and emits attributable findings, suggestions, and thread state. Its satisfaction is not acceptance, and fixes derived from its findings still require appropriate independent verification.

Feedback signal — An attributable report, correction, support observation, incident, or production outcome offered as input to triage or learning. It is untrusted until normalized, scoped, and connected to stronger evidence.

Correction Record — A provenance-backed record of an explicit human change to agent output, including reason, before/after behavior, affected criterion, scope, sensitivity, and proposed reusable destination. It is an improvement input, not an automatically promoted rule.

Human Workflow Profile — A scoped description of an individual's planning, interaction, review, explanation, notification, and accessibility preferences. It can improve fit but cannot grant tools, lower quality gates, or alter organizational authority.

Change Budget — A machine-enforced boundary over changed paths, change size, and permitted change types. It constrains an Attempt's mutation authority but does not prove that an in-budget change is correct.

Quality Gate Decision — A versioned policy decision over an exact Quality Contract, candidate, and evidence set. It records eligibility, explanation, missing or conflicting proof, and required human decisions.

Publication permit — A scoped, expiring, usually single-use authority to perform one external publication action for an exact repository, WorkOrder revision, candidate, and gate decision. It is not merge or deployment approval.

Requirement-to-evidence graph — The traceable relationships among intent, requirements, assertions, implementation artifacts, verification methods, receipts, policy decisions, releases, and production outcomes. Missing, stale, waived, contradictory, and counterevidence relationships remain explicit.

Quality Proof Package — The complete assurance case for one exact release candidate, including its Quality Contract, evidence graph, raw artifacts, provenance, validator receipts, risks, gates, waivers, approvals, deployment, and production evidence.

Software Quality Certificate — A concise, signed projection stating that an exact artifact satisfied a particular Quality Contract using referenced evidence and approvals at a particular time. It does not claim the artifact is defect-free and may expire, be revoked, or be superseded.

Evidence envelope — A normalized immutable record binding a typed claim, producer, method, time, and native artifact to an exact subject digest.

Certificate revocation — An authorized declaration that a previously issued certificate must no longer be relied upon, without deleting its history.

Hard gate — A non-compensable policy condition. A failing hard gate blocks advancement regardless of aggregate quality or trust score.

Quality confidence — A multidimensional assessment of the strength, coverage, independence, freshness, provenance, and reproducibility of evidence for one artifact. A numeric projection may aid trending but cannot replace hard gates.

Artifact Trust — Confidence in one exact change or release candidate based on its current evidence. It is distinct from the historical trust of the agent that produced it.

Agent Trust — Historical evidence about the reliability and policy compliance of a governed executor configuration. It constrains eligible autonomy but cannot certify a particular artifact.

Telemetry — Diagnostic spans, events, metrics, logs, token usage, cost, tool activity, and timing emitted during a run. Telemetry explains behavior; it becomes acceptance evidence only when a governed verifier binds it to an exact subject, method, criterion, and provenance.

Test-impact analysis — The attributable selection of tests and verification methods from changed code, behavior, dependencies, schemas, configuration, and risk. It must explain both inclusion and material omission.

Unit testing — Verification of a small component in a controlled context. It supports fault localization but does not prove integration or user behavior.

Integration testing — Verification that components, services, databases, or external dependencies cooperate under defined conditions. It does not by itself prove a complete user journey.

End-to-end testing — Verification of a complete workflow through its real or qualified interfaces. It provides journey confidence while usually being slower and harder to diagnose than focused tests.

Contract testing — Verification that a producer and consumer satisfy a versioned interface and semantic agreement. Passing syntax checks does not prove business compatibility.

Flaky test — A test whose result changes without a relevant change to its subject or declared environment. Quarantine is visible debt with an owner and expiry, not permission to treat the test as passing.

Test-data management — The discipline of deciding where every fixture, seed record, and synthetic dataset comes from, which version a run used, who may see it, and how it is reset afterwards, so agents never reach for production data because nothing else was supplied.

Mutation testing — Evaluation of a test suite by introducing controlled faults and measuring whether tests detect them. Surviving mutations identify possible weakness but require interpretation.

Property-based testing — Verification of declared invariants across generated input cases. Its confidence depends on the correctness of the property and generators.

Fuzz testing — Automated generation or mutation of unexpected inputs to find crashes, unsafe parsing, resource exhaustion, and boundary failures. It does not establish intended business behavior.

Performance and load testing — Measurement of latency, throughput, saturation, and resource behavior under representative load and failure. A single benchmark environment is not a production guarantee.

Accessibility testing — Automated and human evaluation of whether people with varied access needs can perceive, navigate, understand, and operate an interface. Automated checks cover only part of the requirement.

Visual-regression testing — Comparison of rendered interfaces against an approved baseline under controlled viewports and data. Pixel similarity does not prove semantic or interaction correctness.

Artifact Registry — The authoritative store and metadata service for immutable build outputs, digests, provenance, signatures, SBOMs, lifecycle, and promotion state. A source commit is not a deployable artifact identity.

Progressive delivery — Controlled expansion of an exact release through bounded cohorts, feature flags, canaries, regions, or parallel environments under predeclared gates, stop conditions, observation, and rollback.

Production verification — Independent evaluation that an exact deployed artifact and configuration are technically healthy and satisfy defined production behavior. It remains distinct from customer-outcome confirmation.

Post-deployment verification — Another name for production verification: binding a deployment to expected technical and customer outcomes over a defined observation window, with rollback, containment, corrective work, or human risk acceptance as the outcomes.

Rollback — A governed, pre-engineered transition toward a prior safe artifact or configuration with verification of data, dependencies, and external effects. It is not a universal undo operation.

Context eval (with/without) — A paired evaluation of one skill, rule, or other context artifact: scenarios generated from real work and feasibility checked, each run by the agent without the artifact and with it, judged on multiple binary criteria, and reported as baseline average, with-skill average, and delta. The scenarios are kept as the artifact's regression corpus. A delta near zero means the artifact is context cost without return.

Verifier (file invariant) — A model-judged check on committed files for a single binary, observable invariant (for example, every component file exports an element with a test identifier), emitted as a CI annotation. It verifies the files; it does not decide whether the change needs a human, which is the change-risk policy's job.

Receipt packet — The artifact bundle a bounded runtime produces to prove it executed inside its envelope: manifest digest, commands and exit codes, artifacts and hashes, budget consumed, sandbox and credential scope observed. It is ingested through a receipt endpoint that validates it against the Attempt's frozen manifest before any of it becomes evidence.

Decision Candidate — A bounded implementation observation surfaced during execution and shown in the review package for a human to decide on. Accepting it never rewrites frozen intent; if it implies a different requirement, plan, or architecture, it opens a new Spec or Plan revision or an ADR, and the current WorkOrder is judged against the intent it was dispatched under.

Residual AI — An optional post-verification advisory analysis of a verified candidate by a model, labelled ADVISORY in the review package and the record. It has no authority over any state and cannot satisfy a criterion or count as a receipt.

Execution progress vs acceptance readiness — Two counts a WorkOrder view must show together: Tasks Done over Tasks total (how much work happened) and blocking criteria verified and current over blocking criteria total (how much of the contract is proven). Task count alone is never sufficient for acceptance.

Merge gate — The composite pull-request readiness check bound to the exact head: CI status, review lenses, mutation-testing results where required, and the policy decision for the risk band. It is a gate, not a merge; a human still merges in a first version.

Verification contract 🔑 — A structured specification of the claims that must be demonstrated before work counts as complete and how each will be validated: login works — browser test authenticates; no accessibility regression — verifier passes; latency under threshold — benchmark. Stronger than acceptance criteria alone (Chapter 27).

Verifiable outcome — An outcome whose correctness can be established by deterministic checks or sufficiently reliable independent evaluation. The more completely an outcome can be specified and verified, the more safely its execution can be delegated (Chapter 27).

Verification completeness — The proportion of important outcome claims for which the factory has an independent, reliable verifier. Higher completeness → higher trust → higher permissible autonomy → higher automation (Chapter 27).

Verification-driven autonomy — Autonomy increases as verification confidence increases. The question is not how autonomous agents should be but what can be verified well enough to automate safely (Chapters 11, 27).

Validate the validator — Evaluating the mechanisms that judge agent work, because a bad verifier with a good agent yields false failures and with a bad agent yields false successes. Producer → verifier → verifier evaluation → policy or human authority (Chapter 27).

Orchestrator → worker → validator — The canonical execution pattern: an orchestrator decomposes and coordinates, workers execute bounded units, a validator independently checks each; pass continues, fail reworks; consolidation then final verification (Chapter 27).

Milestone validation — Verifying intermediate outcomes at explicit checkpoints before later execution continues — task, verify, task, verify, milestone, verify — so errors cannot compound across fifty tasks to one final surprise (Chapter 27).

Test–eval continuum — Unit test → integration test → behavioural test → deterministic verifier → rubric eval → LLM judge → production outcome. Use the most deterministic mechanism available for the claim; never an LLM judge to check whether the compiler succeeded (Chapter 29).

Micro-eval — A small, focused evaluation — often ten cases — that detects one behavioural or system regression: caching, compaction, tool selection, retrieval, edit behaviour, retry handling. Between a test and an eval (Chapter 29).

With/without evaluation — Evaluating every factory capability against its absence — skill, retrieval, repository memory, verifier, expensive model, subagent — to prevent cargo-cult architecture (Chapter 30).

Marginal capability value — The measurable improvement in accepted outcomes attributable to a component relative to its cost and complexity: change in quality, success, and human effort over change in cost, latency, and complexity (Chapter 30).

Factory simplicity principle — Add no agentic complexity unless evals show it improves the outcome. More agents, context, models, or verification are not automatically better; every component earns its place (Chapter 30).

Eval-driven factory engineering — Continuous empirical evaluation deciding which models, workflows, skills, tools, context strategies, verifiers, and harness components are retained, modified, promoted, or removed: hypothesis → change → eval → compare → promote or reject (Chapters 30, 41).

Harness effectiveness evaluation — Comparing model × harness combinations on task success, quality, human intervention, latency, tokens, cost, and verification success, to tell a model problem from a harness problem from a workflow problem (Chapters 16, 30).

Benchmark half-life — The period a benchmark stays representative and decision-useful before saturation, contamination, workload change, or optimisation against it erodes its value. Evals need lifecycle management (Chapter 30).

Eval drift — Divergence between what an evaluation measures and what the organisation now considers real success. Eval → monitor → compare with production outcomes → refresh → retire (Chapter 30).

Benchmark overfitting — Optimising agents or workflows for benchmark performance in ways that do not improve, and may degrade, production experience. The optimisation target is production outcomes, not a leaderboard (Chapter 30).

Eval registry — A governed inventory of evaluations — name, purpose, workload class, dataset, rubric, owner, baseline, current score, model and harness compatibility, last validated, production correlation, review date — so evals are first-class factory assets (Chapters 11, 30).

Scorer — A function from a set of agent runs (traces plus the human interactions around them) to a grade against a rubric, assigned by a person, by code, or by a judge model; run on a sampling strategy and cadence because scoring costs money (Chapters 30, 41).

Benchmark matrix — A set of representative reference tasks run in parallel under several factory configurations and graded by the same scorers, yielding a matrix of results from which a change to the factory definition is derived (Chapters 30, 41).

Runtime concepts

Orchestrator — The control-plane actor that sequences authorized work, selects eligible execution paths, reacts to events, and escalates exceptions. It does not approve its own plan or evidence.

Executor — A runtime adapter that performs authorized work using a specific agent or tool environment and returns structured events, artifacts, and status.

Development Environment — The versioned checkout layout, toolchains, dependencies, local and shared services, identities, test data, previews, and commands required to build and evaluate software. It may run on several compute backends and does not authorize its own use.

Development Environment Contract — A versioned declaration of a Development Environment's repositories, toolchains, services, identities, network, secrets, resources, lifecycle, previews, commands, caches, and qualification evidence. An Attempt binds to an exact contract version.

Cloud Development Environment — A remotely hosted Development Environment provisioned through an API or control service. Remote hosting can improve standardization, elasticity, and isolation while introducing network, residency, startup, dependency-access, and provider-control tradeoffs.

Remote development workstation — A full development machine that lives in a data center, provisioned fresh and repeatedly, and reached from a laptop as a thin client; the "cloudtop" pattern. Code never leaves the building and every service started gets an identity-bound URL.

Shared development services — The long-lived, centrally operated databases, queues, identity providers, and internal APIs (a "dev cloud") that individual sandboxes reach over the network rather than running themselves.

Private connectivity and egress control — An authenticated private path from a sandbox into shared development services, and an explicit allowlist of what the sandbox may reach on the public internet, so package registries work and exfiltration does not.

Identity and credential provisioning — The step, at environment creation, that mints a workload identity for the run and attaches the short-lived, scoped credentials that identity is entitled to. It belongs to the environment layer and is undone at teardown.

Toolchain pinning — Fixing every compiler, runtime, package manager, linter, and browser a run can invoke to an exact version recorded by digest, so a build cannot silently change because a tool updated underneath it.

Environment bootstrap — The scripted sequence that takes bare compute to a ready worker: base image, toolchain, checkout, service startup, readiness check. It is automated even for persistent workers and proven periodically by rebuilding from declared state.

Dependency and build caching — Content-addressed caches of restored packages and compiled outputs, keyed by the hash of their inputs, so a cache hit is provably the same bytes a clean build would produce. Each cache needs an explicit invalidation rule.

Preview environment — A running instance of the application built from an Attempt's exact commit, with a stable Attempt identity, authenticated access, bounded lifetime, and deterministic teardown. Its shareable preview URL is an interface for gathering evidence, not evidence of correctness.

Compute Infrastructure — The machines, processes, containers, VMs, storage, network, and capacity pools that host development and execution environments. Compute allocation does not prove environment readiness, isolation, or WorkOrder authority.

Composable AI Infrastructure — AI Infrastructure assembled from replaceable components through explicit, versioned contracts. Composition is real only when required behavior, security, telemetry, lifecycle, and failure semantics survive a substitution.

Enterprise AI Infrastructure — AI Infrastructure operated with explicit organizational identity, tenant isolation, data classification and residency, private networking, audit, policy, quota, support, lifecycle, and accountability requirements. “Enterprise” is an operating obligation, not a product tier.

Open-Source AI Infrastructure — AI Infrastructure whose relevant source and license permit inspection, modification, and self-operation. Adoption still requires evaluation of maintainer health, provenance, vulnerabilities, upgrades, interoperability, support, and total operating cost.

Worker pool — A managed set of execution resources eligible for particular workloads and governed by capacity, queue, lease, identity, environment, isolation, cost, drain, and recovery policy.

Runner fleet — The full set of machines, VMs, or containers on which Attempts execute, operated as a production service with queues, quotas, leases, autoscaling, backpressure, and reconciliation. Worker pools are its interchangeable subdivisions.

Bring-your-own-compute (BYOC) — The arrangement in which the organization owns the compute (its own cloud account, data center, or rack) while a vendor supplies the sandbox API, harness, or orchestration on top of it. It changes who owns the resource boundary, not who owns integration.

Capacity scheduling — The step after admission that matches each admitted Attempt to a worker pool with the right architecture, tools, and network reach, in an order that respects priority class and tenant fairness rather than arrival time alone.

Ephemeral environment — An environment created from declared state for a bounded use and destroyed afterward. Disposability reduces persistence but does not by itself guarantee reproducibility or containment.

Persistent environment — An environment retained across runs to preserve checkouts, caches, or warm services. It requires drift detection, cleanup, credential rotation, and cross-run isolation.

Pets versus cattle — The operations vocabulary for persistent versus ephemeral workers. A pet is a named host repaired by hand; cattle are interchangeable, provisioned by script, and replaced rather than repaired. Also written "pets vs cattle".

Execution Manifest — The immutable Attempt contract that freezes lineage, repository baseline, scope, workflow, agent and skill bindings, harness, model route, context, tools, sandbox, policy, budgets, stop conditions, and completion schema. A retry that changes a material binding requires a new manifest and Attempt.

Harness Capability Manifest — A versioned, digest-bound declaration of a harness adapter's effective models, tools, filesystem, shell, Git, browser, subagent, lifecycle, sandbox, credential, telemetry, backend, maturity, and authority characteristics. It describes what the adapter can do, not what it may do for a particular WorkOrder.

Harness adapter — The versioned translation layer between a harness's native lifecycle and the factory's canonical Attempt contract, events, artifacts, completion, cancellation, and failure semantics. Substitutability must be demonstrated through conformance tests.

Worker capability attestation — A current worker report binding service identity, session, generation, capacity, repository, Factory Version, harness, model route, backend, and sandbox capabilities. The control plane verifies the report; the worker cannot self-authorize from it.

Sandbox Profile — An immutable execution-environment contract covering provider, image and toolchain digests, identity, filesystem, network, secrets, resource ceilings, lifecycle, teardown, supported workloads, and qualification evidence. Promotion grants only its explicitly scoped eligibility.

Repository Workspace Manifest — A versioned map of repositories, canonical identities, baseline selection, checkout layout, ownership, relationships, toolchains, and discovery metadata. It supports multi-repository planning but does not grant write access.

Multi-repository workspace — One directory tree, materialized for a single Attempt, holding checkouts of every repository the work may touch at recorded commits, plus a coordination repository that holds instructions, the workspace manifest, plans, and shared playbooks.

Sparse clone — A partial clone (limited objects fetched) combined with a sparse checkout (limited paths materialized), used when one repository is larger than the task needs. If the manifest's scope is wrong, the excluded material is exactly what would have revealed a dependency.

Coordinated change set — A governed collection of repository-scoped WorkOrders, candidates, pull requests, dependencies, global invariants, integration evidence, merge order, release sequence, and rollback. It is not an atomic cross-repository commit.

Integration candidate — A versioned manifest of exact repository commits, packages, images, schemas, or other artifacts that must be verified together. Its digest is the cross-repository subject of integration evidence; it is not a synthetic commit.

Execution admission — The fail-closed decision that an exact WorkOrder, Factory Version, route, harness, sandbox, worker, policy, budget, repository, and environment combination may begin or continue. Ranking happens only after eligibility.

Candidate — An immutable artifact set produced by an Attempt and bound to its exact source and manifest. A candidate is input to verification, not a success or acceptance declaration.

Completion report — The explicit terminal report for an Attempt. It records whether execution succeeded, partially completed, blocked, failed, or was cancelled; identifies exact artifacts and criteria; and states unresolved findings and required human action. It does not accept the WorkOrder.

Merge queue — A repository mechanism that orders eligible pull requests and evaluates them against the current target branch and required checks before merge. Queue eligibility does not replace human or policy authority.

Agentic merge maintenance — Bounded automation that keeps a human-approved candidate eligible by updating its base, rerunning checks, resolving proven mechanical conflicts, and escalating material change. It does not own the merge decision.

Agent merge queue — An informal term that can mean either a repository merge queue containing agent-authored pull requests or agentic merge maintenance. Use the two precise terms because ordering and validating eligible changes is a different authority from modifying a candidate to keep it eligible.

Merge babysitting — The practitioners' name for agentic merge maintenance: an agent keeps a human-approved candidate eligible against a moving base branch by rebasing, rerunning checks, resolving bounded mechanical conflicts, and escalating the rest. It never takes the merge decision.

Worktree — An isolated Git working directory used to keep concurrent changes separate and bind an Attempt to an exact repository state.

Preflight — The fail-closed evaluation performed before execution. It checks authority, repository state, executor capability, environment, tools, secrets, capacity, budget, risk, and policy.

Executor snapshot — The immutable copy of the complete executor configuration (adapter, version, planning backend, worker backend, configuration version) that dispatch writes onto the Attempt. The Attempt never re-resolves repository policy files or the live Factory Version; editing, superseding, or deleting the Factory Version never changes a historical Attempt; retry is a new Attempt with a new engine identity.

Prohibited authorities — The six authorities an execution-engine adapter must demonstrably lack to be admitted: worker leases, verification subjects, verification plans, evidence authority, GitHub publication, and acceptance. An adapter holding any of them is a second control plane.

Required external controls — The five controls that must exist outside an adapter before it is admitted, supplied by the factory's own worker: the canonical worker lease, sandbox policy, repository-scope reconciliation, independent verification, and the publication permit. Adapter selection is the only engine-specific step; there is no engine-specific worker path.

Lease and heartbeat — Runtime controls that establish which worker currently owns work and whether it remains alive. They help detect abandoned or duplicate execution.

Idempotency — The property that repeating the same command does not create duplicate authoritative effects. It is essential when events, retries, or network responses may be delivered more than once.

Reconciliation — The process of comparing durable intent with provider and artifact state after an ambiguous, delayed, duplicated, or partial external effect, then recording the authoritative outcome without assuming success or repeating the effect blindly.

Retry policy — A versioned rule specifying which failure classes may create a new attempt, required changed hypothesis or recovery action, delay, limits, budgets, and escalation. Retry cannot widen authority or erase failure history.

Backoff and jitter — A delay strategy that spreads retries after transient failure to reduce synchronized load on a dependency. It complements rather than replaces idempotency, timeout budgets, and reconciliation.

Circuit breaker — A control that temporarily stops calls to a failing or unsafe dependency after defined conditions and probes for recovery under policy. Opening a circuit should produce an operator-visible state and fallback decision.

Recovery Time Objective (RTO) — The maximum targeted time to restore a defined factory capability after disruption. Different capabilities may have different objectives.

Recovery Point Objective (RPO) — The maximum targeted loss of durable state for a defined capability after disruption. Authority and audit records often require stricter objectives than diagnostic telemetry.

Regional failover — Moving the control plane and its authority records to a second region when the first is lost. It is the exercise most likely to produce two active authorities if fencing was designed for a single region.

Chaos testing — Deliberately injecting the failures on the scenario list into a running system to confirm that declared degraded modes and recovery paths actually engage. Begin with simulation and controlled fault injection.

Factory postmortem — An incident review that names which layer failed (model, harness, environment, orchestration, policy, evidence, or human decision) and whether the factory's authority records stayed truthful throughout.

Break-glass access — Narrow, time-limited emergency authority protected by strong authentication, independent logging, explicit reason, and post-event review. It must not become the routine control path.

Backpressure — A mechanism that slows or rejects new work when downstream capacity is insufficient. It protects the system from unbounded queues and resource exhaustion but requires explicit prioritization and user-visible state.

Preemption — Stopping lower-priority work to make room for higher-priority work. It is safe only for work with checkpoint or cancellation semantics; non- idempotent external effects are never killed blindly, and sunk cost and evidence are preserved.

Provider limits — The rate, concurrency, token-per-minute, and spend ceilings a model or compute vendor enforces on an account. The scheduler treats them as shared capacity to allocate rather than a surprise to retry through.

Admission control — The fail-closed policy that determines whether work may enter or continue in a runtime lane given authority, readiness, capability, risk, budget, quota, and dependency state. It precedes scheduling.

Scheduler — The component that chooses when and where eligible work runs using priority, fairness, deadlines, capabilities, locality, cost, and current capacity. Scheduling cannot make ineligible work admissible.

Capacity reservation — Resources held for a bounded workload class such as incident recovery so normal demand cannot consume every qualified execution or review path.

Capacity planning — Forecasting and provisioning qualified model, environment, compute, tool, storage, network, and human-review capacity for expected demand, growth, failure, and recovery reserves.

Cost per accepted outcome 🔑 — Total model, compute, environment, tool, storage, retry, validation, and human-attention cost divided by independently accepted outcomes. It is more decision-useful than token price alone.

Dead-letter or quarantine queue — A retained destination for work or events that cannot be processed safely after bounded handling. Placement preserves identity, failure reason, evidence, owner, and recovery decision; it is not silent abandonment.

Immutable history — An append-oriented record of plans, decisions, Attempts, events, evidence, and revisions. Corrections create new records rather than silently rewriting the past.

Durable messaging — Events are written to a persistent log or broker before any consumer sees them, delivered at least once, and retained long enough to replay, so a consumer that was down when a fact occurred still receives it.

Event schema — The versioned definition of what each event payload type contains and how it may evolve, kept in a schema registry with advertised version ranges.

Artifact storage — The object store for logs, diffs, test output, packages, and evidence blobs, addressed by content digest. Metadata and the digest remain authoritative in the control store; the blob is what the digest names.

Declarative workflow — A workflow described as what it consists of (nodes, inputs, outputs, dependencies, triggers, timeouts, budgets, gates, completion states, required evidence) rather than scripted as how to run it, which makes it inspectable before execution and diffable between versions.

Workflow versioning — Every change to a workflow contract produces a new immutable version with a digest; a running WorkOrder stays bound to the version approved when it started, and migrating it is a new decision with its own authority.

Workflow snapshot — The copy of a versioned workflow definition frozen onto the run that uses it, so that later edits to the workflow never rewrite the execution contract of a historical Attempt. It is the mechanism that makes workflow versioning hold for runs that have already happened.

Compensation — A recorded, forward action that neutralizes a completed external effect (closing the PR, deleting the branch, posting a retraction) when a workflow fails. It is not undo; it has its own authority and its own failure path.

Triggers, schedules, and webhooks — The three intake shapes: a trigger is any authenticated signal that proposes work, a schedule is a trigger that fires on a clock, and a webhook is a trigger that fires when an external system reports a change. None of them starts execution without admission.

Attestation — A typed claim made by an identified producer about one or more immutable subjects. A valid attestation does not by itself prove quality.

Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) — A machine-readable inventory of the components and dependency relationships associated with an artifact. It aids supply-chain analysis but does not prove that the artifact is secure.

Trace context — Correlation metadata propagated across service and asynchronous boundaries. It connects observations but does not confer authority.

Loop — The smallest unit of agency: observe what the environment returned, act with one tool call, verify with an external signal, and repeat until a goal condition is met. Completion is decided by evidence, never by the model's own judgment or a step count.

Graph — The workflow layer above the loop: nodes do one unit of work against typed shared state, conditional edges read that state and name the next node, and checkpoints after each node allow pause, replay, and human review. A loop decides whether execution continues; a graph decides where it goes.

Harness — The runtime wrapped around a model that determines what its reasoning can actually do: the callable tool set, permissions and approval gates, the context it is shown, the execution environment, and the immutable trace of every turn. Model capability and agent capability differ exactly by what the harness exposes.

Execution graph — The six typed nodes every production agent runs in order — perceive, build context, decide and plan, act, evaluate, respond — joined by stateful edges with conditional routing, parallel branches, subgraphs, checkpoints, and resumability. Graph engineering is the discipline of designing it; the harness owns it.

Loop engineering (the bounded feedback path) — Within one execution graph, what runs when evaluation says the goal is not complete: observe, diagnose, refine or replan, retry, under termination criteria (maximum iterations, time, token, and cost budgets) set by the harness rather than the model (Chapter 15). An iteration cap is containment, not a substitute for progress detection. This is the mechanism the wider discipline of the same name — loop engineering, below — is engineering.

Secure tool gateway — The single door between an agent's Act step and the world: MCP servers, APIs, code execution, databases, files, and other agents, behind schemas, permissions, authentication, secrets handling, sandboxing, and approvals. A tool the gateway does not expose does not exist for the agent.

Meta-harness — A governance layer across several harnesses (hosted coding agents, internal agents, domain agents) that supplies composition (which agents exist and who may delegate to whom), policy enforced once, shared resumable sessions, and pluggable isolation. In this guide its responsibilities belong to the control plane and Agent Factory governance.

Compaction threshold — The context size at which a harness summarizes conversation history rather than re-sending it; a deliberate default that trades recall against repeated input cost and cache bursts.

Prompt-cache TTL — How long a provider keeps a cached prompt prefix. Cache reads are cheap and cache writes carry a premium, so the right TTL depends on the typical idle gap between turns: longer for interactive sessions with pauses, shorter for short-lived subagents.

Isolation model — The written statement of what one Attempt is allowed to affect, as policy dimensions: identity and authorization, scoped credentials, network policy, filesystem policy, tool permissions, time limits, token and compute budgets, frozen scope, kill switch, replay protection, auditability, and compliance. Each dimension is default-deny, granted in the manifest, enforced outside the model, and proven by a negative test. An agent can be intelligent without being trusted; the sandbox defines what intelligence is allowed to affect.

Replay protection — Idempotency keys, nonces, and expiry on every control-to-execution command, event, and credential so that a captured or duplicated message cannot produce a second effect after the run ended.

Completion record — What a run hands back instead of "done": what changed → why → by whom or what → using which context, tools, and models (including the routing trace) → what was verified → what evidence supports acceptance, each link drawn from records rather than from the model's account of itself, and accountable to the execution trajectory beneath it.

Execution trajectory — The ordered sequence of decisions, tool calls, state transitions, retries, and escalations one run took from manifest to result. The completion record summarises it; trajectory evaluation grades it.

Structured evidence — The fixed fields every finding carries whatever produced it: severity (consequence × likelihood), calibrated confidence, affected code bound to the subject digest, recommended action, the evidence behind it, and the producer's identity and version. Findings as prose cannot be counted, deduplicated, or measured.

Incident ownership — A named person, not a queue, attached to an incident at promotion time, with the completion record and forensic bundle in hand. The control tower routes on owners; an incident without one is telemetry.

Loop engineering — The discipline of designing agent workflows that grow more reliable, efficient, and capable through repeated execution and measured feedback: trigger design, context assembly, execution, state, logging, verification, evaluation, outcome capture, failure classification, refinement, regression testing, controlled promotion. A loop acts, observes, reasons, and repeats to a termination condition; a chain runs once (Chapter 24).

Inner loop 🔑 — Fast, inexpensive feedback available during execution — tests, types, compiler, linters, static analysis, architecture rules, policy checks, local verifiers — that lets the producing agent detect and correct its own mistakes before handoff. Its objective is autonomy (Chapter 16).

Outer loop 🔑 — Deeper, independent verification performed after or around the producing agent's work — review agents, security review, integration and end-to-end tests, agentic QA, browser verification, acceptance validation, risk assessment — to decide whether the result is trustworthy. Its objective is automation (Chapter 16).

Meta loop 🔑 — The governed loop that observes executions, failures, reviews, corrections, and outcomes and proposes improvements to the factory itself — new tests, lint rules, skills, context, verifiers, routing, pruning. Its objective is learning, and its defining constraint is that it may not self-authorize, mutate governance, bypass verification, or become a token sink: signals are observed, clustered, turned into candidates, reviewed by a human, trialled as experiments, and only then promoted. Also written meta-loop (Chapters 16, 41).

Four loop layers — Feedback loops (raw signals: tests, linters, scans), verification loops (objective evidence before trusting results), memory loops (retained context, failures, and patterns), and optimisation loops (updating the factory's own prompts, triggers, and constraints from metrics) (Chapter 40).

Harness debt — Accumulated prompts, skills, rules, checks, adapters, and orchestration that once compensated for agent limitations and no longer justify their complexity or cost as models improve (Chapter 16).

Harness pruning — Systematically removing obsolete instructions, checks, workarounds, and orchestration: component → evaluate with → evaluate without → measure the delta → retain, simplify, or remove (Chapter 16).

Agent readiness 🔑 — The degree to which a repository, system, or environment can be safely and effectively operated by agents, scored across testability, CLI accessibility, build reproducibility, documentation, context quality, sandboxability, credential access, observability, deterministic validation, architecture clarity, environment reproducibility, and dependency health — the Agent Readiness Score (Chapter 26).

Deterministic feedback surface — The set of machine-readable checks and signals — compiler, types, tests, coverage, linters, architecture checks, security scans, performance thresholds, structured logs, metrics, build results, schema validation — that let an agent judge its own progress without human judgment. Its coverage is feedback surface density (Chapter 26).

Architecture linting — Machine-enforceable checks that turn architectural intent — dependency direction, layer boundaries, ownership, API contracts, naming, security boundaries, observability requirements, forbidden dependencies, data-access rules — into feedback agents consume while implementing. Architecture becomes an executable constraint (Chapter 26).

Factory-friendly architecture — Software designed so agents can safely understand, modify, execute, and verify it: strong typing, clear module boundaries, fast tests, deterministic builds, integrated tooling, CLI accessibility, explicit interfaces, reproducible environments, machine-readable errors, strong contracts (Chapter 26).

Execution budget — A policy-defined maximum of tokens, spend, compute, time, tool calls, retries, or model tier that a workflow may consume before it must stop, escalate, or request authorisation; set at task, mission, repository, team, and organisation levels (Chapter 9).

Cost prediction — Estimating the inference, compute, tool, and verification cost of an outcome before or during execution, so the factory can answer what an outcome will probably cost the way cloud infrastructure does (Chapter 9).

Platform experience and agentic security

Developer portal — A user-facing projection of catalog, workflow, ownership, documentation, evidence, and control-plane services organized around developer outcomes. It must not become a second source of authority.

Service catalog — A maintained inventory connecting services, repositories, owners, dependencies, interfaces, workflows, environments, runbooks, and maturity. Catalog presence does not establish readiness.

Golden path — A supported, observable, self-service route for a recurring outcome with defaults, templates, controls, documentation, recovery, ownership, and measured adoption. It requires an explicit extension and exception model.

Extension model — The published answer to "how do I add something the path does not do": which points may be extended, what an extension must declare, and what compatibility it must keep. Extensions are versioned and tested; silent forks are what it prevents.

Platform ownership — A named team accountable for the paved paths, their service levels, their deprecations, and the experience of using them, so the platform is never an orphan that everyone depends on and nobody answers for.

Plan preview — A decision-oriented view of proposed steps, assumptions, affected systems, capabilities, tests, cost, uncertainty, rollout, and rollback before authority is granted to an exact Plan version.

Live progress — The execution view's running account of what a run has done and expects to do next, updated as the run proceeds. Its unit is the progress event: decisions, discoveries, scope changes, evidence, budget, and next transition, written for a person.

Pause/resume — The reversible pair of interventions in which pause holds the lease and retained state so the run can continue from the same point, distinct from cancel, which releases the lease and records a terminal state.

Review inbox — A prioritized control surface for decisions requiring human authority, showing scope, risk, evidence, recommendation, alternatives, deadline, and consequence of action or inaction.

Indirect prompt injection — Adversarial instructions embedded in content the agent retrieves or observes rather than supplied as the direct user request. Untrusted content cannot grant authority or alter policy.

Tool poisoning — Manipulation of tool descriptions, schemas, endpoints, or outputs to influence agent behavior, steal data, or trigger unsafe action. Registry provenance, output validation, policy, and least privilege constrain its impact.

Memory poisoning — Insertion of false, adversarial, or unauthorized content into durable memory so future runs inherit the attack. Recovery includes quarantine, provenance analysis, affected-run inventory, and controlled repair.

Goal hijacking — Prompt injection that replaces the task's objective with the attacker's while the agent still believes it is doing the assigned work.

Privilege abuse — Misuse of a grant the agent legitimately holds for an action the grant was never meant to cover, as distinct from escalation to a grant it does not hold.

Workload identity — A cryptographically issued identity for a non-human principal (an agent, worker, or service) — SPIFFE, OIDC, mTLS — with short-lived credentials, so that authorisation and audit attach to the workload itself and never to a borrowed human credential. It identifies the actor but does not itself authorize a resource operation; that is a separate policy decision made using the identity.

Just-in-time access — Authority granted for one bounded purpose, one scope, and one window, then withdrawn. In the factory it is granted to an Attempt through the frozen execution manifest, not to an agent standing.

Separation of duties — The rule that the actor who produces a change may not be the sole authority that verifies, accepts, publishes, or releases it; enforced by identity and policy, not by convention.

Agent kill switch — The standing ability to disable or quarantine an agent or a session immediately, revoking its tokens and leases. It stops the bleeding; it is not recovery, which is a new Attempt from a known-good checkpoint.

UEBA for agents — Behaviour analytics applied to non-human principals: a baseline of normal tool use, data access, and timing per agent, with anomaly, privilege-escalation, exfiltration, and goal-drift detection against it.

Agent trust score — A diagnostic composite of an agent's policy violations, anomaly rate, evidence currentness, and outcome history. It may trigger demotion or review; it never grants autonomy, which requires evidence through the promotion gate.

Zero trust (for agents) — Verify explicitly, least privilege, assume breach, encrypt end to end, monitor continuously, automate security — applied to agents, tools, memory, and models as principals in their own right.

Guardrails — Predefined rules that limit what an agent can do or say, applied at the input, the tool call, and the output. Guardrails constrain; they do not verify — a guarded agent can still be confidently wrong, which is why evidence sits behind them.

Agent identity — A non-human identity assigned to an agent or workload so that every action it takes is attributable, authorised, and revocable separately from any person's credentials. Short-lived tokens, least privilege, and an audit trail follow from it.

Audit trail — The durable, tamper-evident record of every agent action, why it happened, and who authorised it. It is how agent-executed work stays explainable after the fact; see Audit export for the packaged form.

Ontological bias — The way a model's training and the context it is shown shape what gets imagined and what gets excluded — which options are proposed, which risks are named, which users are assumed. Countered by explicit constraints, diverse evaluation sets, and human review of framing, not only of output.

Excessive agency — An agent given more authority, tools, or autonomy than its task requires, so that a mistake or a hijack has more to reach. The remedy is least privilege in every dimension.

Inter-agent trust — The assumption that a message from another agent carries that agent's authority when it carries only its content. Delegation is recorded and verified; peer output is untrusted content.

Denial of wallet — Resource exhaustion intended to cause excessive model, compute, tool, storage, or human-review cost. Budgets, quotas, backpressure, anomaly detection, and bounded retries limit exposure.

Delegated authorization — The attributable chain by which an accountable principal permits a specific workload to perform bounded actions for an exact subject, purpose, and time. Every delegation may narrow but not widen authority.

Data retention policy — The versioned rules governing how long prompts, context, telemetry, artifacts, evidence, memory, indexes, and backups are kept, who may access them, and how deletion or legal hold works.

Data residency — The requirement that defined information and processing remain within approved geographic or legal locations throughout providers, backups, telemetry, and derived stores.

License compliance — The controls that identify software and content licenses, evaluate policy compatibility, preserve attribution, and block or escalate unacceptable use. Generated output does not remove provenance duties.

Policy as code — Versioned, testable policy expressed in machine-executable form. It improves consistency but does not replace ownership, rationale, exceptions, evidence, or human risk accountability.

Install policy — The rules governing which skill packages may be installed, set at project, workspace, and organization level with the tightest level winning. Three rule types: a security threshold with a warn level (install needs explicit acceptance) and a block level (no override), a source restriction (registry limits and Git allowlists), and a minimum release age. Every install attempt is logged against the policy that decided it.

Minimum release age — An install-policy rule requiring that a Git-sourced skill version has existed for a set number of days before it may be installed, so that a freshly pushed payload has time to be noticed and scored before it reaches an agent.

Autonomy and trust

Operational autonomy — A revocable, scoped grant of authority. It belongs to a governed workflow, not to a model.

Trust Score — A numeric internal signal from 0 to 100 used for eligibility and trend analysis. It cannot override policy or grant authority directly.

Trust band — An operator-facing interpretation of the Trust Score: Very Low, Low, Moderate, High, or Trusted.

Promotion 🔑 — A human-approved increase in eligible autonomy after sustained evidence. A model upgrade or isolated success cannot promote itself.

Demotion — A policy-driven reduction in eligible autonomy after declining performance or a trust-loss event. It may occur automatically.

Quarantine — A fail-safe condition that prevents autonomous execution for an affected scope until authorized review and recovery occur.

Learning Signal — A bounded, attributable observation derived from an Attempt, evaluation, review, incident, delivery, or production outcome. It can include a human correction, repeated instruction, context miss, tool mismatch, validation failure, cost anomaly, or successful strategy. It can support an improvement proposal but cannot modify active configuration.

Improvement Candidate — A reviewable proposal to change a prompt, Agent Definition, skill, tool, context policy, model route, evaluator, budget, retry policy, workflow, or deterministic implementation. It must name evidence, baseline, expected benefit, risk, evaluation, promotion, and rollback.

Factory maturity level — An evidence-backed description of the operating capability achieved by a specific workflow, repository, risk class, and environment. It is not a permanent organization-wide badge.

Guarded Auto — A routing mode in which the platform may choose the model, harness, and backend tuple for a run automatically, but only once sample size, quality margin, cost coverage, and hard eligibility meet policy. Until then routing stays advisory or pinned. In Mission Control it is disabled at the pinned commits; a routing decision never widens the authority of the work routed.

Capability Maturity Ledger — The single canonical record of each capability's status, evidence, limitation, owner, and next promotion gate, maintained at the current revision. Architecture documents define intended contracts and plans describe proposed work; when a status claim disagrees with current source or retained evidence, the ledger is what gets corrected. It is the document to read for what a capability is rather than what it was designed to be.

Context and configuration concepts

Context policy — The rules determining which Context Packages an agent is eligible to load for a given task, and under what budget. It constrains what may enter the working set; it does not guarantee the agent used what it loaded.

Context miss — An observed condition in which an Attempt lacked context it needed and that the factory could have supplied. It is evidence about the context system, not a verdict on the agent.

Context overload — An observed condition in which an Attempt was supplied more context than it could use effectively. It indicates a budgeting or selection defect; more retrieval is not the remedy.

Factory Memory — The governed retrieval surface over a factory's own accumulated artifacts, decisions, traces, and outcomes. It is a first-class subsystem serving factory execution, not a general enterprise search product or a sidecar chatbot, and retrieval from it is not evidence. Retrieved text is untrusted: it cannot approve, invoke tools, or satisfy acceptance.

Context CDL — The context definition lifecycle of a registered context package (a versioned skill, rule, or document with scope, name, content hash, quality score, and security status): draft → publish → install → deprecate. Publish makes a version immutable; install binds an exact version; deprecate stops new installs while history still resolves.

CBOM — The Context Bill of Materials: a snapshot taken at run start of every context package an Attempt can see, with version, hash, install source, and selection reason. It answers "which runs were exposed?" when a package is later found wrong or poisoned. Advisory; it records what was shown, not what was authorized.

Agentic retrieval (sufficiency loop) — Retrieval by a bounded planner that retrieves, assesses whether the context in hand is sufficient for the task, reformulates, and retrieves again until sufficient or the iteration, token, or time bound is reached. It never expands authorization scope: every iteration runs under the same requester, tenant, purpose, and classification ceiling.

Recipe — A reusable, versioned execution pattern describing how a class of work is normally carried out, including the shape of the plan, the agents and skills typically involved, and the expected verification. A recipe proposes an approach; it does not authorize execution or accept a result. On a Factory Board the eight recipes (Scout, Plan, Build, Quality, Build+Test, Build+Review, Plan+Build+Test, Full SDLC) are rule-based recommendations, and a recipe never lowers active policy.

Model routing 🔑 — The policy-governed selection of which model serves a given step, based on declared eligibility, capability, cost, and risk. A routing decision is a configuration outcome; it does not widen the authority of the work being routed.

Factory learning and improvement

Learning candidate — A learning observation recorded additively on an Attempt and its WorkOrder, typically read from an execution engine's own lessons store after a terminal successful run and emitted as an idempotent learning.candidate.proposed event. It is telemetry: it cannot accept a WorkOrder, satisfy a verification receipt, or change configuration, and it earns an Improvement Candidate only through recurrence.

Signal severity — The operator-facing weight assigned to a learning signal: Low, Medium, High, or Critical. Severity orders attention; it does not determine whether a change is permitted.

Learning cluster — A grouping of related learning signals over a bounded window, used to distinguish a recurring systemic pattern from an isolated incident. Clustering is an analytical projection; it creates no obligation and proves no cause.

Governed experiment — A bounded, reversible trial of an improvement candidate under explicit success criteria, scope, and stop conditions, run so that its effect can be measured before any durable change. An experiment produces evidence; it does not promote itself.

A/B testing — A controlled comparison that assigns eligible cases to two versions under predefined measures, guardrails, sample, duration, stop conditions, and analysis. Assignment does not override workflow authority or user and data protections.

Prompt optimization — Controlled experimentation that changes instructions or prompt composition to improve defined outcomes without widening authority. It requires holdout evaluation, regression controls, and versioned promotion.

Tool optimization — Controlled improvement of tool selection, schemas, descriptions, execution, or feedback based on attributable outcomes. A tool change creates a new evaluated capability version.

Skill improvement — A governed update to a reusable task method based on diagnosed evidence, followed by evaluation, certification, promotion, and rollback planning.

Improvement type (Rule / Skill / Verifier / Refactor) — The four destinations for a correction mined from review history: a Rule for an always-on convention, a Skill for a multi-step procedure needed on demand, a Verifier for a binary observable invariant on files, and a Refactor for a structural change paired with a rule or verifier so it holds. Prefer the deterministic end. Each is a governed candidate through the promotion gate, not a change.

Learning from success — Analysis of matched successful runs to identify strategies associated with accepted outcomes, low retry, safe recovery, cost, and human attention. Incidental or sensitive context must not become standing instruction.

Evaluator calibration — Comparison of an evaluator against trusted labels, rubrics, counterexamples, and bias tests to determine where its judgments are reliable enough for a defined claim.

Inter-rater reliability — Measurement of agreement among independent human or automated raters beyond chance or simple majority. Disagreement should be investigated rather than averaged away.

Statistical significance — Evidence that an observed difference is unlikely under a defined null model. It does not establish practical value, safety, causal validity, or freedom from bias.

Promotion recommendation — The evidence-backed suggestion that a validated improvement be adopted into the standing factory configuration. It remains a recommendation until a human with the relevant authority accepts it.

Recursive improvement boundary — The invariant that the system improving the factory is subject to the same policy, verification, and acceptance controls as the work the factory performs. A learning subsystem is not exempt from the governance it informs.

Explicit feedback — What a person deliberately says about an output: a review comment, a rated response with a reason, a typed correction, a finding marked wrong. Precise, rare, and biased toward the vocal.

Implicit feedback — What a person does with an output, recorded without being asked: the finding acted on or scrolled past, the suggestion merged unchanged or rewritten, the change that shipped clean or returned as an incident. Abundant, noisy, representative, and evidence only once joined to the record it concerns and the outcome that followed.

Builder behaviour signals — The implicit signals that carry most of the information: comment acceptance, reviewer override, dismissed finding, and later incident. A dismissed finding followed by an incident on the same lines is strong evidence the dismissal was the error.

Failure taxonomy — A versioned classification of the ways the factory gets things wrong, by cause rather than symptom (wrong context retrieved, right context ignored, tool misuse, specification gap, unsafe action blocked or not blocked, evaluator miss, routing mismatch, budget exhaustion, human-process failure). It turns individual signals into clusters with counts, trends, and owners.

Candidate improvement — The output of Propose in the learning loop: a versioned proposal with hypothesis, evidence, scope, and rollback that has earned nothing yet.

Controlled improvement — A candidate that has passed Verify (regression, shadow evaluation, A/B, canary rollout, in that order) under a predeclared experiment and been promoted by a person with authority proportional to its blast radius.

Recursive system improvement — The seven-step loop (Execute → Observe → Evaluate → Learn → Propose → Verify → Promote) run against the factory's own components with the same records and gates as customer software. Never Execute → automatically rewrite production.

Adaptation ladder — The ordered set of ways to change agent behaviour, by how much of the system each touches and how reversible it is: Rules → Retrieval/Context → Prompt → Skill → Routing → Fine-tuning → Preference optimisation and training. Climb one rung at a time with evidence that the rung below was insufficient; never jump straight to training.

Fine-tuning 🔑 — Updating a model's weights, or an adapter on top of a frozen base, on a governed dataset so that a stable, well-specified behaviour no longer has to be re-taught in every context window. Domain-level tuning (a stable vocabulary or convention) is the most defensible use; behavioural adaptation (how the model plans, asks, and reports) is harder to specify and evaluate. A tuned model is an artifact with its own benchmark, certification, and rollback.

Preference optimisation — Training a model from human preference data (pairs of outputs with a judgment about which is better) rather than from examples of correct output, either directly or through a reward model. The top rung of the adaptation ladder and the least attributable.

RLHF 🔑 — Reinforcement learning from human feedback: the best-known family of preference-optimisation methods, in which a reward model trained on human preference data guides updates to the policy model's weights. It consumes exactly the acceptance, edit, override, and dismissal signals the factory collects, which is why those signals must be trustworthy and attributed first.

Reward model — A model trained to predict human preference judgments, used to score outputs during preference optimisation. It is a grader with every grader's failure modes, including reward hacking, and is evaluated as one.

Repository memory — The per-repository, versioned record of what an automated reviewer has been right and wrong about here, which findings this codebase's maintainers accept, and which patterns have escaped before, distilled from review history and fed back to the repository profile and suppression rules through the promotion gate, never appended to a prompt in place.

Finding deduplication — Collapsing findings that name the same defect from different reviewers, rules, or lines of the same hunk into one record with all evidence attached, keyed on affected code and category rather than wording. It precedes noise suppression and thresholding.

Noise suppression — Removing findings a repository has already ruled on: categories the profile marks inapplicable, patterns dismissed with a reason before, findings below the tier's request-changes threshold. Suppressed findings are retained and counted, not deleted.

Confidence threshold — The calibrated-confidence level, set per repository class from measured precision, above which a finding is published, in a band below which it is routed to a person as a question, and below which it is dropped and counted. Dropped findings are kept so a later incident can show the threshold was wrong.

Maintenance loop — A recurring agent workflow that continuously maintains or improves software health without waiting for backlog prioritisation: dependency upgrades, flaky-test repair, coverage, documentation, accessibility, security remediation, architecture conformance, dead code, modernisation, debt (Chapter 41).

Maintenance agent — A specialised agent responsible for one dimension of software or factory health — test health, dependencies, documentation, architecture conformance, context drift, cost, readiness, security hygiene. Humans own domains; agents maintain dimensions (Chapter 41).

Meta-loops that observe loops — Loops whose purpose is to observe, evaluate, diagnose, or improve other loops: failure analyser, cost optimiser, context-drift detector, skill optimiser, verifier-quality monitor, routing optimiser, factory-health monitor (Chapter 41).

Automation discovery — Agents analysing issues, PRs, comments, logs, CI failures, and repeated commands to find repeated patterns that become candidate skills and candidate loops — the factory proposing its own expansion (Chapter 41).

Self-improvement levels — Observe → diagnose → recommend → propose (a PR to a skill, context, test, or harness) → verify (against the regression suite) → promote (after policy-defined approval). Autonomous proposal is never autonomous promotion (Chapter 41).

Self-improvement agent — An agent that reads scored runs, finds patterns in failures and successes, and proposes diffs to the factory definition for humans to review and merge (Chapter 41).

Workflow discovery — Using execution traces and evaluation results to find sequences of reasoning, retrieval, tool use, delegation, and verification that reliably solve a class of task: discover → evaluate → encode → reuse (Chapter 41).

Factory flywheel — Intent → Definition of Correct → context → skill → execution → evidence → verifier → evaluation → outcome → learning → improved skills and context, repeated; higher quality earns higher autonomy, more runs, more evidence, better context, better verification, higher quality (Chapter 41).

Architecture, governance, and operations concepts

ARM (Agent Runtime Management) — The layer that manages running agents as templates (registered Agent Definitions), versions (immutable revisions by digest), instances (one running agent bound to a version, Attempt, lease, sandbox, and budget), and identities (the workload identity each instance authenticates as). An instance is never more than its version and identity allow. The Agent Fleet view is its operator surface.

Controlled execution system — The 2026 landscape's name for what a factory should be: isolated execution environments, lifecycle hooks at every consequential step, durable checkpoints, independent verification, and evidence correlation from intent to outcome. It is not an unattended agent swarm. Its opposite, the dark factory, is an aspiration and not a safe default; progressive autonomy is the doctrine for moving toward it.

Factory Board — The guided entry surface: it recommends a recipe, drafts a Mission with a stop condition, and compiles a Plan for human review. It never dispatches and never accepts; both remain separate commands.

Engineering OS (EOS) — The outcome-oriented shell that organizes a factory's surfaces by what an engineering organization is doing rather than by which service renders them: Strategy, Delivery, Operations, Intelligence, Knowledge, and Governance, all over the same control APIs and permissions.

Factory System Record — The governed accountability and classification record for one material autonomous delivery system. It identifies purpose, owners, scope, registry references, data, integrations, risk, autonomy ceiling, evidence, incidents, and lifecycle without duplicating the authoritative service, capability, model, policy, or evidence registries.

Autonomy ceiling — The highest action class a system, workflow, capability, or grant may perform under current policy and evidence. The narrowest applicable ceiling wins; runtime confidence cannot raise it.

Boundary Contract — The versioned command or event contract crossing a responsibility or trust boundary. It defines identity, authority, schema, state, delivery, idempotency, timeout, failure, evidence, human decision, and compatibility behavior.

Side-effect class — The highest consequence category of a capability call: read-only, reversible mutation, publication, deployment, destructive mutation, privileged administration, or external communication. It determines minimum authorization, evidence, and recovery controls.

Delegation Record — A durable, versioned assignment from one authorized participant to another that binds purpose, scope, capability, context, authority, budget, completion, failure, and return contracts. Delegation cannot widen the authority held by the delegator.

Emergency Control — A tested independent mechanism for pausing, cancelling, revoking, quarantining, rolling back, failing over, or shutting down a governed subject. A visible control is not evidence until enforcement and recovery have been exercised.

Recertification — A periodic or event-triggered decision that rechecks ownership, purpose, risk, autonomy, models, evaluators, capabilities, dependencies, policy, evidence, incidents, drift, cost, and outcomes for an exact governed scope.

Control Tower — An operations projection that links governed system inventory to authority, health, quality, safety, cost, drift, incidents, response, and verified closure. It invokes authoritative control APIs but does not replace their records.

Verified closure — The incident or finding state reached only after containment, recovery, downstream reconciliation, independent validation, notification decisions, residual risk, and accountable acceptance are recorded. Service restoration alone is not closure.

Trusted core / untrusted extension boundary — A deterministic core that owns state, policy, and reliability, separated from agent-written or user- written code that may act only through bounded calls with no path for authority to cross back.

Sandboxed extension API — The bounded interface through which extensions act on a trusted core: an allowlist of calls, no ambient credentials, and lifecycle control (publish, activate, revoke) held by the core.

Agentic shell around a deterministic core — The shape of extensible software in which agents reason and extend in real time around a core that enforces contracts. The phrase applies to products and to the factory itself.

Dynamic code generation — Code written at run time, for this user and this moment, rather than shipped in a release, and executed through the sandboxed extension API.

Agent-generated extension — A small versioned piece of behavior that an agent authored and that the core loads through the sandboxed API with the same lifecycle as a human-written plugin.

Prototype-as-spec — A large generated prototype used as the specification itself, then sliced into reviewed pull requests through the factory.

Interaction mock — A clickable, generated approximation of a user interface built to test how something should feel before anyone decides how it should work.

Discovery prototype — A throwaway built to answer one product question and discarded once the answer is recorded.

Tracer bullet — A thin end-to-end slice through every layer of a proposed architecture, built to prove the path is passable rather than to deliver a feature. Also called a technical spike.

Adoption wedge — The one workflow, in one team, valuable enough to fund an embedding and repeatable enough that its artifacts transfer; usually the governed issue-to-PR corridor. Each product organization's first wedge is chosen with its design partners, not assigned.

Co-building — Building an integration with a product team rather than for it or advising it from outside, so that the team can do the next one alone and the platform learns what its abstraction was missing.

Builder enablement — The deliverable of an embedding: the product team's ability to extend and maintain what was co-built after the embedded engineer leaves. A working integration only the engineer understands is a failure.

Embedded engineering — A platform engineer placed inside a product team for a bounded period, working from that team's backlog on that team's repositories. The first step of the forward-deployed loop: Embed → Observe → Co-build → Productise → Contribute → Reuse → Scale.

Migration tooling — The productised form of the most common co-build: scripts and adapters that move a team's existing agent, prompts, or evaluation cases onto the platform's contracts in the gravity-well order, so that the fourth team's migration is a command, not an engagement.

Local factory — A product organization's own factory (harness wrappers, review agent, evaluation sets) built because it knows its domain and cannot wait. The shared platform learns from it, productises what generalises, contributes it back, and leaves what is local; it neither suppresses nor absorbs it.

Reusable artifact — A skill, tool, Agent Definition, repository profile template, migration script, or document that a bespoke solution becomes when it is productised: versioned in the Agent Factory with an owner and an evaluation, rather than a branch in one team's repository.

Harness engineering (discipline) — Designing the execution environment, feedback mechanisms, checks, tools, context, and improvement loops that let agents complete increasingly complex work with less intervention at equal or better quality: engineering the system in which agents engineer the software (Chapter 16).

Factory control plane — The control plane's explicit responsibility list: loop inventory, scheduling, triggers, permissions, identity, model configuration, context deployment, skill versions, policy, budgets, observability, logs, evaluations, verification, dashboards, promotion. Own this even where runtimes are adopted (Chapter 13).

Context plane — The cross-cutting system holding institutional knowledge, skills, standards, repository intelligence, history, retrieval, and the context lifecycle (Chapters 2, 20).

Factory engineering — Building, measuring, maintaining, and improving the loops that produce software — the work engineers increasingly do instead of the work the loops automate (Chapters 2, 41).

Factory continuum — AI assistance → skills → automation → loops → connected loops → factory. The share of work performed by loops rises gradually; there is no completion date (Chapter 38).

Bottleneck migration — As generation capacity grows the constraint moves: implementation is scarce, then review, then verification, context quality, intent definition, and governance, then factory engineering itself. Automation moves bottlenecks upstream to intent and downstream to verification (Chapters 1, 8).

Role fungibility — Agent-mediated ability for people to execute useful work across traditional functional boundaries by delegating specialised implementation to governed agents — a designer ships a production PR, an engineer writes a product specification (Chapter 8).

Latent quality capacity — Inexpensive agent capacity directed at quality work that never competed for scarce engineering time: UI consistency, accessibility, copy, dependency hygiene, refactoring, coverage, documentation, debt. Factories raise quality, not only velocity (Chapter 8).

Outcome measures

Token economics (tokenomics) — The discipline of controlling model inference spend without reducing validated output: choosing which model runs which work, what the model is shown, how many turns a loop takes, what is cached, what is automated away, and what is stopped. Organized by the cost equation and judged by cost per validated outcome.

Cost equation — Total agent spend decomposed into multiplying terms: users × sessions per user × turns per session × requests per turn × tokens per request × price per token. The first two are adoption and should grow; the middle three are work the agent does on its own behalf and are where optimization lives; the last is chosen by routing workloads to models.

Cost per outcome — Spend divided by accepted, validated outcomes (a merged change, a resolved incident, a completed review), the only cost figure a factory optimizes for. Cost per token and token volume are diagnostic inputs.

Trusted throughput — Accepted, verified outcomes per unit of time and cost: the factory's throughput measure, and the quantity the six architectural areas and their surrounding adoption concern are optimised for. Raw output that raises volume while lowering the accepted, verified share lowers trusted throughput.

Pareto-optimal model selection — Choosing, for each managed agent, the model configuration that no other configuration beats on both cost per completed task and quality, using a benchmark built from that agent's own real work, and re-running the choice as the model frontier moves.

Managed agent — An agent the platform runs on a person's behalf for a defined SDLC workload (code review, CI self-healing, on-call triage, maintenance) with its own benchmark, model route, harness, and budget, and a human review or escalation path. The most controllable layer of agent usage.

Session analysis — Automatic inspection of session traces across every harness a person uses, classifying waste into named anti-patterns, each with a financial impact and a remediation, and feeding the result back as guidance rather than a cap.

Lead Time to Validated Customer Value — Time from governed Mission creation until the change is deployed, independently verified in production or an equivalent environment, and the expected customer outcome is confirmed.

Change Failure Rate — The proportion of deployments that require rollback, hotfix, emergency intervention, or cause a customer, reliability, security, or SLO failure within the defined observation window.

Engineering Leverage — The increase in validated customer value delivered per engineer without a corresponding increase in cognitive load, coordination, or failure.

Four factory dimensions — Autonomy (how much correction the agent needs) × automation (how much human initiation, supervision, and approval the workflow needs) × quality (does the software meet the bar) × economics (what an accepted outcome costs). The target is the economically optimal autonomy and automation that satisfies the quality and risk threshold, not maximum autonomy (Chapter 8).

Autonomy versus automation — An agent can complete a hundred PRs correctly while a human inspects every one: high autonomy, low automation, and review is the bottleneck. Autonomy is measured in corrections and takeovers per task; automation in agent-initiated share, touchpoints per outcome, and auto-merge rate (Chapter 8).

Human touchpoint — Any event where a person must intervene for a workflow to progress: clarification, replanning, correction, PR comment, manual testing, credential provisioning, approval, merge, deployment, recovery. Human touchpoints per accepted outcome is the factory's automation measure (Chapter 8).

Manual takeover rate — The share of agent executions in which a person had to take control to complete the task (Chapter 8).

Human leverage ratio — Accepted, verified outcome per unit of human attention — verified outcomes per human hour, or accepted change volume per touchpoint. The factory should raise human leverage, not token consumption (Chapter 8).

Cost per verified outcome — Total factory cost — generation, retrieval, tools, subagents, retries, verification, human effort — to produce an outcome that has independently satisfied its verification contract. The engineering sub-metric beneath cost per accepted outcome (Chapter 9).

Factory economics — The full cost of the factory — inference, compute, tooling, sandboxes, storage, verification, retries, human review, failure remediation, opportunity cost — against its full return: velocity, quality, human leverage, backlog elimination, risk reduction, broader participation (Chapter 9).

Factory ROI — Value created relative to the full cost of operating and improving the factory: engineering hours avoided, cycle time, defects prevented, debt eliminated, throughput, review burden, reliability, incident remediation, expanded contribution, less context switching (Chapter 9).

Core factory metrics — PR throughput, average cost per PR, automation percent (human touchpoints per PR), savings over human work, and acceleration of shipped product — inner-loop measures more granular than DORA, available only from a closed-loop factory (Chapter 8).